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INTRODUCTION
With the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
1
Lopez, the Court began its long effort to reverse the sixty-year trend
toward increasing federal dominion over traditionally local activities.
Surprising to many at the time of its decision, Lopez signaled the modern Court’s resistance to allowing Congress to exercise a general legislative power through the Commerce Clause, particularly in cases in2
volving non-economic criminal activity.
3
Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA),
which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within one thou4
sand feet of a school. The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress did not have the power to pass the
5
law because it was not substantially related to interstate commerce.
In so doing, the Court announced a new framework for deciding
whether a particular statute is within Congress’s authority under the
6
Commerce Clause. Under this new framework, the Court will be extremely deferential to Congress in cases involving statutes that regulate some form of economic activity, but less so in evaluating regula7
tions that involve non-economic activity. The Court found that the
GFSZA involved non-economic activity, and struck down the law after
determining that the regulated activity did not substantially affect in8
terstate commerce.

1

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See infra Part II.A.1.
3
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2006)).
4
See id., 104 Stat. at 4845 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(B)) (defining
“school zone” as “within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school”).
5
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (striking down the GFSZA because possession of a gun
in a school zone could not be shown to substantially affect interstate commerce).
6
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (noting that Lopez “provides the proper framework” for analyzing a statute under the Commerce Clause).
7
See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
8
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11.
2
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To an outside observer, neither the Court’s holding nor its reasoning is very surprising. Merely possessing a gun in a school zone
does not seem like an activity that would substantially affect interstate
commerce, and it makes sense that the Court would be suspicious of
Congress’s attempts to criminalize this type of non-economic activity
9
under its power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”
What made Lopez such a shocking turn of events, however, is the fact
that it marked the first time since 1937 that the Supreme Court had
struck down a federal statute on the grounds that it was beyond Con10
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
11
Corp., the Commerce Clause had been regarded as a general grant of
12
legislative power, and, indeed, Congress had used it as such. The
shock of Lopez came not from its outcome, but from its stunning departure from established Commerce Clause precedent.
Rather than overrule the previous sixty years of Commerce Clause
cases, Lopez reinterpreted many of the earlier cases to make them fit
within its new framework. While Lopez was a surprising shift in Commerce Clause doctrine at the time of the Court’s decision, two major
13
14
subsequent cases, United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich,
have reinforced the Lopez framework and continued the effort to pull
back on what the Court has seen as the increasing federalization of
control over traditionally local activities. Since 1995, federal courts
have been more willing to strike down federal laws as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, particularly those laws that
15
have dealt with non-economic criminal activities.

9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004)
(“From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.”).
11
See 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (upholding legislation that, in aggregate, has a “close
and substantial relationship to interstate commerce”).
12
See THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 103-04
(Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (claiming that through its decisions between 1937
and 1995 the Court “turned the commerce power into the equivalent of a general
regulatory power and undid the Framers’ original structure of limited and delegated
powers”); Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 2 (observing that before Lopez, the commerce
power was the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation under which
countless criminal and civil laws were enacted).
13
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
15
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
18 U.S.C. § 2252A, which prohibited knowing possession of child pornography, was
10
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During this same time, some high-profile and gruesome murders
caught national headlines and led many prominent politicians and
civil rights leaders to join in a call for stronger federal laws against bias16
motivated crimes of violence, or “hate crimes.”
On June 7, 1998,
James Byrd, Jr., an African-American man, accepted a ride home from
17
three men who turned out to be white supremacists. Rather than
driving him home, the three men took him to a secluded area where
they beat him, chained him to the back of a pickup truck, and
18
dragged him for three miles along a paved road. Medical examiners
believed that Byrd lived through most of this until a collision with a
19
drainage culvert ripped his head and torso from his body.
Later that same year, on October 7, 1998, two men murdered Matthew Shepard, a homosexual college student, after they became en20
raged when Shepard made sexual advances toward them. The two
men kidnapped Shepard, beat him, tied him to a fence like a scare21
crow, and left him to die. A biker found Shepard the next day, barely
22
23
alive. After five days in a coma, Shepard died from his injuries.
unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose intrastate possession of child pornography had too attenuated a connection to intrastate commerce), vacated, 546 U.S.
801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006); Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir. 2003) (granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Federal Controlled Substances Act), rev’d, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the authority to enact a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence), aff’d, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. But see
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held A Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369,
371, 378-91 (describing the ways in which lower courts have applied Lopez and finding
that, although some courts have been willing to strike down federal statutes based on
that decision, most have tended to limit it to its facts).
16
See Cordula Meyer, Liberty Bell Rally Seeks Protection for Gays Through Hate-Crime
Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 23, 1998, at B2 (describing the actions of individuals in
Philadelphia to influence legislators to create hate crime laws that protect gays and
lesbians in Pennsylvania); see also Dan Hasenstab, Comment, Is Hate a Form of Commerce?
The Questionable Constitutionality of Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
973, 973-74 (2001) (noting the connection between these high-profile murders and
the push to enact federal hate crime legislation).
17
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 238
(2005).
18
Id. at 238-39.
19
Id.
20
Tom Kenworthy, Gay College Student Who Was Beaten Dies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct.
13, 1998, at 20.
21
James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1998, at A9.
22
Id.
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These two brutal murders set off a firestorm of national attention
as political leaders such as President Clinton and Attorney General
Janet Reno joined with civil rights leaders to call for national hate
24
crime legislation.
In the months that followed, Senator Edward
Kennedy responded by proposing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
25
1999, which would have made it a federal offense to commit a crime
of violence motivated by the victim’s race, religion, gender, sexual
26
orientation, or disability. Although this bill never became law, it has
27
been reintroduced in each Congress since that time.
Recently, the debate over hate crime legislation has again heated
up, spurred in part by the events surrounding the “Jena 6” and the
subsequent wave of noose hangings throughout the country. In August 2006, white students at Jena High School in Jena, Louisiana,
hung two nooses from a tree in the school’s courtyard—apparently as
28
a signal to black students not to gather near the tree. The students

23

Gay Student Dies; 2 Face Murder Charges, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 13,
1998, at A1.
24
See Carla Crowder, Clinton Saddened by Wyo. ‘Hate’ Assault: President Says Beating of
Shepard Shows Need to Pass Hate-Crimes Bill, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Oct. 11,
1998 (discussing President Clinton’s call for national hate crime legislation that would
cover crimes motivated by sexual-orientation bias in response to Matthew Shepard’s
murder); House Expresses Dismay at Murder of Gay Student in Wyoming, WASH. POST, Oct.
16, 1998, at A24 (noting how Matthew Shepard’s murder motivated Congress to consider laws that would broaden hate crime punishments and make it easier for federal
law enforcement to prosecute such crimes); Charles A. Radin, Kennedy Vows Push for
New Rights Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1998, at B2 (citing Senator Kennedy’s opinion that the murders of Byrd and Shepard made federal hate crime laws particularly
necessary); Reno Urges Matthew Shepard Law, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 19, 1998, at
2A (“Attorney General Janet Reno urged Congress to expand federal hate crime laws
to include offenses based on sexual orientation, saying that the brutal slaying of gay
Wyoming student Matthew Shepard shows that the government must take a stronger
stand.”).
25
S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999).
26
Id. § 4.
27
See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
28
Mary Mitchell, Did Civil Rights Movement Pass Louisiana By? Racist Incident Leads
to Harsh Justice for Black Students, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at 12. The true story of
what happened in Jena seems to be controversial. Craig Franklin, a local reporter in
Jena whose wife taught for many years at Jena High School, claims that the commonly
accepted story is largely a creation of the media. Among other disputes with the commonly accepted facts, Franklin claims that the nooses were not hung as a message to
black students not to sit under the tree, but rather as a prank aimed at fellow white
students who were members of the school’s rodeo team. According to Franklin, the
students who hung the nooses had no idea about the nooses’ racial connotations and
expressed sincere remorse when told. See Craig Franklin, Media Myths About the Jena 6,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2007, at 9. Whatever the true version of these
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responsible for the nooses were lightly punished by the school and
were not charged with a crime because their conduct violated no state
29
law. Racial tensions began to build in the town after residents found
the nooses, eventually leading to an incident in which six black students beat a white student unconscious. Police arrested the six students responsible for the beating, and initially charged them with at30
tempted second-degree murder. Spun as a racially motivated double
standard, the story began to attract national attention. On September
20, 2007, more than ten thousand protesters gathered in Jena in what
has been called one of the largest civil rights protests since the Civil
31
Rights Era of the 1960s.
After the Jena incident, nooses began to appear in public places
32
around the country, leading civil rights leaders to call for—and many
33
states to consider—statutes that would outlaw the hanging of nooses.
Spurred by these incidents, several thousand protesters gathered outevents may have been, it is undeniable that the popularly reported version of events
sparked a renewed interest in hate crime legislation.
29
Mitchell, supra note 28. While it was commonly reported that the white students who hung the nooses received only a three-day suspension, Franklin contends
that in fact their punishment involved nine days at an alternative facility, two weeks of
in-school suspension, Saturday detentions, attendance at Discipline Court, and evaluation by mental health professionals. Franklin, supra note 28.
30
Mitchell, supra note 28.
31
Theo Milonopoulos, Sharpton Leads Call for Federal Investigation of Hate Crimes,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at A12; see also Susan Roesga et al., Thousands ‘March for Justice’
in Jena, Court Orders Hearing on Teen, CNN.COM, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/
2007/US/law/09/20/jena.six/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (describing the
protest and noting the involvement of people from across the country).
32
See Mark Potok et al., Op-Ed., The Geography of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at
11 (“In the past decade or so, only about a dozen noose incidents a year came to the
attention of civil rights groups. But since the huge Sept. 20 rally in Jena, La., where
tens of thousands protested what they saw as racism in the prosecution of six black
youths known as the ‘Jena 6,’ this country has seen a rash of as many as 50 to 60 noose
incidents.”); Jake Wagman, Noose’s Revival is Raising the Issue of Intent, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Jan. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate
crimes nationwide, finds fewer than a dozen noose reports in a typical year. But in the
last four months, the center says, there have been between 60 and 70, including incidents at a Home Depot in New Jersey, a factory in Houston and at Columbia University
in New York, where a noose was found hanging on the door of an African-American
professor’s office.”).
33
See Jaime Malarkey, Lawmakers: Include Nooses as Hate-Crime Symbols, EXAMINER
(Balt.), Jan. 17, 2008, available at http://www.examiner.com/printa-1163272~
Lawmakers:_Include_nooses_as_hate_crime_symbols.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008)
(discussing two bills debated in a Maryland House of Delegates committee meeting
that would make the hanging of nooses a hate crime); Wagman, supra note 32 (noting
that Missouri and other states are considering legislation criminalizing nooses in response to the Jena incident).
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side the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., on November 16,
2007, to demand a stronger federal response to bias-motivated
34
35
crimes. Although current federal hate crime proposals would only
36
affect crimes committed because of bias that “caus[e] bodily injury,”
the renewed attention that the Jena incident has brought to these proposals has lent strength to the push for their enactment.
In 2007, federal legislators rode this momentum to the nearpassage of the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
37
Prevention Act of 2007 (“Matthew Shepard Act” or “the bill”). The
Matthew Shepard Act would have expanded the classes protected by
existing civil rights laws and made it easier to exercise federal jurisdiction over bias-motivated violent crimes by relying on the Commerce
Clause as the source of congressional authority. Despite generating
wide support in both houses of Congress, the Matthew Shepard Act
ultimately failed to become law when President George W. Bush
promised to veto it if it came before him. Calling the bill “unnecessary and constitutionally questionable,” the Bush Administration
noted that Congress could only federalize this area of criminal law if it
did so in implementation of a power granted to it, such as the power
34

Milonopoulos, supra note 31.
Among these proposals is the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007), which is the statute that is
the primary subject of this Comment.
36
In fact, it is likely that if the Matthew Shepard Act were law, the six black students in the Jena case would face federal prosecution, but the white students would
not, because the bill only criminalizes bias-motivated crimes “causing bodily injury.” S.
1105 § 7(a)(2)(A). This highlights a problem with lumping all bias-motivated crimes
together as hate crimes. The drafters of the Matthew Shepard Act, facing criticism that
the bill could implicate serious free speech concerns, specifically inserted language
denying that any form of speech can amount to a crime under the bill. See id. § 7(d)
(refusing to allow evidence of expression or associations of the defendant as substantive evidence unless it is used to establish bias relating to the defendant’s conduct);
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.matthewshepard.org/
site/DocServer/HRC-LLEHCPA-FAQ1-17-07.pdf?docID=463 (asserting that the evidentiary rule of § 7(d) addresses concerns that the Matthew Shepard Act could be
used to prosecute speech). The House version of the bill also contains a rule of construction that would prevent interpretations of the statute in any way that would “prohibit any expressive conduct protected from legal prohibition by, or any activities protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of, the First Amendment to the
Constitution.” Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R.
1592, 110th Cong. § 8. While the attention the Jena 6 case has brought to hate crimes
has undoubtedly helped in the campaign to turn the Matthew Shepard Act into law,
had it been law at the time of the Jena incident, the bill may have actually served to
exacerbate the situation.
37
S. 1105; see also H.R. 1592.
35
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38

to regulate interstate commerce. Without elaborating, the Administration indicated that the bill did not appear to be properly within
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause or any other
39
granted power.
In response, a number of supporters of the Matthew Shepard Act
have argued for the bill’s constitutionality. In so doing, they have
40
claimed that because the bill contains a jurisdictional element it will
survive analysis under the Lopez framework and will therefore be a
41
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
While the Supreme Court has made clear that the presence of a jurisdictional element that ensures that federal authorities can only prosecute cases having a substantial effect on interstate commerce would
support the bill’s constitutionality, none of the arguments in favor of
the bill has provided a detailed analysis of its constitutionality under
42
Lopez. Rather than analyzing the bill’s jurisdictional element to de38

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1592—LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES
PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/sap/110-1/hr1592sap-h.pdf.
39
Id.
40
A jurisdictional element is “a fact included in a statute that must be pled and
proven by the plaintiff in each case, serving as a nexus between a particular piece of
legislation and Congress’s constitutional power to enact that legislation and to regulate
the conduct at issue.” Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV.
643, 679 (2005). Jurisdictional elements in statutes enacted under the Commerce
Clause therefore seek to limit the application of the statute to those cases that have a
nexus to interstate commerce. See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the
Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2101, 2105-06 (2006) (“In a Commerce Clause context, the jurisdictional
hook requires that the regulated activity or object have a nexus to interstate commerce.”). In the context of a federal criminal law, such as the Matthew Shepard Act,
the jurisdictional element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before the federal government can claim to have jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
41
See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HATE CRIMES: SKETCH OF SELECTED PROPOSALS AND CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 4 (2002), available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/CRS.hate1.pdf (indicating optimism for the
prospects of Court approval of an earlier version of the Matthew Shepard Act because
it contained the jurisdictional element present in current versions); Anthony E. Varona & Kevin Layton, Anchoring Justice: The Constitutionality of the Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act in United States v. Morrison’s Shifting Seas, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9,
14 (2001) (“[The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act’s] multiple jurisdictional
elements ensure that the legislation allows Congress to address the national problem of
hate-motivated crimes while still fitting into the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as well as the Court’s increasingly conservative view of congressional authority.”).
42
Generally, the debate surrounding the Matthew Shepard Act is limited to a
claim by opponents that Morrison prevents Congress from criminalizing violent crime
that does not cross state lines, and a response by supporters that the bill is constitu-
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termine if it sufficiently limits the range of federal jurisdiction to ensure that each crime substantially affects interstate commerce, these
commentators generally mention in passing that the bill would be
43
constitutional simply because it contains a jurisdictional element.
This is not surprising, given that there is currently no Supreme
Court case directly addressing the issues of whether the mere presence of a jurisdictional element will enable a statute to survive scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause, and, if not, how limiting the element
must be in order for the statute to survive. In fact, a comprehensive
treatment of jurisdictional elements is the only piece of Lopez’s framework that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed. Lopez identified
three factors to consider when determining whether a congressional
statute regulating non-economic activity that is said to substantially affect interstate commerce is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause: (1) whether the statute contains a jurisdictional element that would limit the class of cases to those substantially
affecting interstate commerce; (2) whether the statute contains any
findings showing the regulated activity’s connection to interstate
commerce; and (3) whether the regulated activity is a necessary piece
44
of a larger regulation of economic activity. Building on the foundation of Lopez, the Court addressed the sufficiency of congressional
findings in Morrison and the effect of a greater regulation of economic
activity in Raich. To this point, the Court has not taken the opportunity to address the characteristics of a valid jurisdictional element.
The Supreme Court may soon be presented with such an opportunity in the form of the Matthew Shepard Act. With the increasing
attention drawn by hate crimes nationally, and the success of recent
votes on proposed hate crime legislation, passage of a federal hate
crime law within the next few years seems probable, particularly in
light of the recent election of Barack Obama as President of the

tional because, unlike the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of Morrison, the Matthew Shepard Act contains a jurisdictional element. For a good example of this debate, see Markup of H.R. 1592 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 57, 18586 (2007).
43
See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 41 (predicting that the bill will survive a Commerce
Clause challenge because its jurisdictional element precludes conviction unless the activity has the requisite nexus to interstate commerce); Varona & Layton, supra note 41,
at 12-14 (asserting that the jurisdictional element and the case-by-case analysis it demands will “ensure” that the legislation falls within the commerce power).
44
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (explaining the factors that the Court considered in its Lopez decision).
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45

United States. If this new federal criminal law passes, it will be on a
direct collision course with the federalism principles announced in
Lopez. Ultimately the United States Supreme Court must resolve this
tension, and the constitutionality of the law that reaches the Court will
turn on the effectiveness of its jurisdictional element. What is needed
now is what no one has yet provided: a detailed analysis of the Matthew Shepard Act’s jurisdictional element.
This Comment provides such an analysis of the Matthew Shepard
Act and closely examines its jurisdictional element to determine
whether, if passed, the bill would withstand a constitutional challenge
under the Commerce Clause using Lopez’s framework. Part I offers a
brief history of hate crime legislation and describes the relevant provisions of the Matthew Shepard Act. Part II details modern Commerce
Clause doctrine as reflected in Lopez and the two major decisions
since: United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich. Part III analyzes
the Matthew Shepard Act under the Lopez framework and concludes
that if the bill is to be a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, it must be because the bill’s jurisdictional element
effectively limits the class of cases covered to those that substantially
affect interstate commerce. Part IV engages in a detailed analysis of
that jurisdictional element, determining that the element is too broad
to allow the bill to withstand constitutional challenge. Part V argues
that Congress should abandon its attempt to federalize hate crime
laws because a version of the Matthew Shepard Act amended to ensure its constitutionality would add very little to the protections already available under state law. The Comment concludes by predicting that if Congress passes the current version of the bill, the effect of

45

President-elect Obama has repeatedly expressed his support for the Matthew
Shepard Act. See Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need, Civil Rights,
http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/civil_rights/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008)
(“Obama and Biden will strengthen federal hate crimes legislation, expand hate
crimes protection by passing the Matthew Shepard Act, and reinvigorate enforcement
at the Department of Justice’s Criminal Section.”); Open Letter from Barack Obama,
United States Senator and Candidate for President of the United States, to the LGBT
Community (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://obama.3cdn.net/36ddd2f5daac41cb21
_rym6bxaax.pdf (“[A]s President, I will place the weight of my administration behind
the enactment of the Matthew Shepard Act to outlaw hate crimes . . . .”). In fact, in
2007, while he was in the United States Senate, President-elect Obama voted to pass
the Matthew Shepard Act. See 153 CONG. REC. S12,205 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2007). As of
now, the only thing preventing the Matthew Shepard Act from becoming law is President Bush’s threatened veto, so, if President-elect Obama continues to support federal
hate crime legislation and removes that veto threat, a new federal hate crimes law
should soon follow.
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its collision with Lopez will be a landmark case that rounds out the
Court’s modern Commerce Clause doctrine by clarifying the effect of
jurisdictional elements in federal statutes.
I. FEDERAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 created the existing federal criminal
46
laws regulating bias crimes. To maintain a prosecution under the
current law, the government must prove two elements: First, the defendant must have committed the crime because of the victim’s race,
47
religion, national origin, or color. Second, the defendant must have
intended to prevent the victim from exercising a federally protected
48
right such as voting or attending a public school. Although this law
provides for some federal involvement in the prosecution of hate
crimes, the federally-protected-activity requirement seriously limits
49
this potential. For instance, the murder of neither James Byrd, Jr.,
nor Matthew Shepard could be prosecuted under federal law because
50
The
neither victim was engaged in a federally protected activity.
Matthew Shepard Act would expand the protected classes to include
51
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability, and would
52
eliminate the federally-protected-activity requirement.

46

See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2006) (making it unlawful to injure, intimidate, or
interfere with any person because he is engaging in a federally protected activity because of his “race, color, religion, or national origin”).
47
Id.
48
The activities protected include (1) attending a public school, (2) receiving a
benefit or using a facility administered by a State, (3) applying for employment, (4)
serving as a juror, (5) using a common carrier for transportation, and (6) staying at a
hotel or eating at a restaurant. Id.
49
See Varona & Layton, supra note 41, at 10 (highlighting the substantial barrier to
successful prosecution that is erected by the requirement that the perpetrator “must
have intended to prevent the victim from exercising a federally protected right” (emphasis added)).
50
Although federal charges could not be brought, both sets of defendants were
convicted under state law for the murders. John King and Lawrence Brewer were both
sentenced to death, and Shawn Berry was sentenced to life in prison, for the murder of
James Byrd, Jr. In addition, Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney were both given
consecutive life sentences for the murder of Matthew Shepard. See infra note 82.
51
S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(4) (2007).
52
Compare id. § 7 with 18 U.S.C. § 245.
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A. History of the Matthew Shepard Act
The Matthew Shepard Act is the most recent in a long line of proposals attempting to expand federal jurisdiction over bias-motivated
crimes. In the 1990s, many of these proposals involved the collecting
53
and reporting of hate crime statistics. The first bill attempting to
expand the classes covered by existing federal bias-crime statutes and
remove the federally-protected-activity requirement was the Hate
54
Crimes Prevention Act of 1997, introduced by Senator Edward Ken55
nedy in the 105th Congress. Since that time, Senator Kennedy has
introduced a bill in each Congress that is substantially similar to the
Matthew Shepard Act and that would create federal jurisdiction over
56
bias-motivated crimes.
As noted above, the highly publicized murders of James Byrd, Jr.,
and Matthew Shepard in 1998 generated considerable momentum for
federal hate crime legislation. The bill came close to passing in the
wake of the publicity generated by these crimes when the Senate ap57
proved it as an amendment to the 2001 defense appropriations bill.
The House version of the defense bill, however, did not contain the
amendment, and eventually the House version prevailed in committee. After this near victory, federal hate crime legislation, although
introduced by Senator Kennedy in each Congress, did not again come
close to passing into law until 2007.

53

Congress has sought to increase the awareness of bias-motivated crime since
1990. In that year, the Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note (2006)), was passed, which requires the Attorney General to collect and publish data on crimes committed because of the victim’s race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. In 1994, Congress
passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note), requiring the
United States Sentencing Commission to increase the penalty for defendants who selected their victims based on the victim’s race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. In 1998, Congress passed the Campus
Hate Crimes Right to Know Act, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 486, 112 Stat. 1581, 1743
(1998) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(ii) (2006)), requiring campus security
officers to collect and report data on crimes committed based on the victim’s race,
gender, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or disability.
54
S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997).
55
It was this bill that President Clinton urged Congress to pass the next year following the murders of James Byrd, Jr., and Matthew Shepard. See Crowder, supra note 24.
56
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT 1 (2007),
available at http://
www.matthewshepard.org/site/DocServer/HRC-LLEHCPA-FAQ1-1707.pdf?docID=463.
57
S. 2550, 106th Cong. tit. XV (2000).
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In 2007, with the election of a Democratic majority in Congress
and the publicity generated by the Jena incident, federal hate crime
legislation again came to national attention. On May 3, 2007, the
House passed its own version of the Matthew Shepard Act—the Local
58
Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007. On the same
day, President Bush responded by threatening to veto the bill if it
came to him, claiming that the bill was “unnecessary and constitution59
ally questionable.” Fearing a presidential veto, the Senate approved
the bill as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act
60
61
for Fiscal Year 2008 on September 27, 2007. After being sent to
committee for reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the
defense bill, the Matthew Shepard Act amendment was removed because of a sense that together the two controversial bills could not
62
generate the necessary support. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has
said that she still is committed to passing a federal hate crime prohibi63
tion, so the issue is likely to reappear in the near future. Given the
results of the 2008 presidential and congressional elections, a federal
hate crime statute could soon become a reality.

58

H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007).
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY, supra note 38.
60
H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. (2007).
61
See 120 CONG. REC. S12071 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2007). Although the bill could
have passed the Senate on its own, the bill’s supporters thought that it would be more
difficult for the President to veto the defense authorization bill, particularly because it
contained politically popular pay increases for soldiers. See S.A. Miller, Gay Protection
Tacked onto Defense Bill; Bush’s Veto Would Be First in U.S. History, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2007, at A1. If the bill had been passed and vetoed, it is unlikely that the bill’s supporters could have gathered enough votes to override the veto. See Rick Klein, GayRights Proposals Gain in Congress: Measures Would Add Protections, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
25, 2007, at A1 (“Democratic leaders say that while they have enough votes to approve
[hate crime legislation], they probably could not override a presidential veto.”).
62
See Editorial, Caving in on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22 (claiming that a majority supporting the combined bills could not be reached because “some
liberals did not want to vote for the defense bill and some conservatives did not want to
vote for the hate crimes bill”).
63
See Press Release, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Hate Crimes
Legislation (Dec. 6, 2007), http://speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=0432 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2008) (stating that Pelosi is “strongly committed to sending the hate
crimes legislation, passed by the House [in 2007], to the President for his signature”
and that “House Democratic leaders will work with [their] Senate colleagues to make
certain that a hate crime bill passes the Senate and goes to the President’s desk”).
59
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B. Structure of the Matthew Shepard Act
The Matthew Shepard Act is broken into two sections. Section
7(a)(1) includes the same classes as the Civil Rights Act (race, religion, and national origin), but does away with the federally-protected64
activity requirement. In removing this requirement, the bill cites the
Thirteenth Amendment as the source of congressional authority over
65
crimes motivated by bias against these classes. The claim is that because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment
to authorize Congress to “[abolish] all the badges and incidents of
slavery” even by restraining private actors, Congress may therefore use
this authority to prohibit bias-motivated crimes based on race, relig66
ion, and national origin. Some commentators have presented arguments suggesting problems with relying on the Thirteenth Amend67
ment to authorize a federal hate crime law, but the inquiry here is
more concerned with the second section of the bill, which contains
the jurisdictional element.
Along with removing the federally-protected-activity requirement,
section 7(a)(2) adds gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability
to the list of protected classes. Because these classifications never
were a means for promoting slavery, the protection of these classes

64

S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(1) (2007).
Id. § 2(7)–(8). The Supreme Court has held that the Thirteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to enact laws to eliminate the “badges and incidents of slavery,”
even by restraining private actors. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 43940 (1968) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers the federal government to prohibit racially biased actions of private parties); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“[T]he power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States . . . .”). As the argument goes, because slavery was racially based, the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes laws designed to remedy racial discrimination. In addition, because nationality
and religion were often used as a proxy for race, one may argue that the Thirteenth
Amendment can be used to prevent discrimination based on these classifications as
well. See Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 1009-10 (discussing arguments for and against
the use of the Thirteenth Amendment to support a federal hate crime law).
66
Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-40.
67
See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against
Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1220-21 (2000) (arguing both that
even if a hate crime law could be supported by the Thirteenth Amendment, it would
still be constitutionally problematic under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that the Supreme Court would avoid approving a bill that puts two constitutional amendments in conflict); Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 1009-10 (observing that
the doctrine surrounding the Thirteenth Amendment is not well developed and noting the differences between race and religion as well as civil and criminal statutes).
65
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cannot be based on “removing the badges and incidents of slavery,”
and the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be used as the source of federal power to enact the bill. Because the Thirteenth Amendment
cannot support the bill, its drafters have sought to legislate under the
Commerce Clause as a way to eliminate the federally-protected-activity
requirement.
To support the bill’s constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, its authors included findings attempting to show how biasmotivated crimes affect interstate commerce. The bill states the following:
Such violence substantially affects interstate commerce in many ways, including the following:
(A) The movement of members of targeted groups is impeded, and
members of such groups are forced to move across State lines to escape
the incidence and risk of such violence.
(B) Members of targeted groups are prevented from purchasing
goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating
in other commercial activity.
(C) Perpetrators cross State lines to commit such violence.
(D) Channels, facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
are used to facilitate the commission of such violence.
(E) Such violence is committed using articles that have traveled in in68
terstate commerce.

In addition to findings that support the connection between biasmotivated crimes and interstate commerce, the bill also includes a jurisdictional element, which attempts to ensure that only situations
where the crime substantially affects interstate commerce trigger federal jurisdiction. The bill’s jurisdictional element contains multiple
prongs through which federal prosecutors can establish the necessary
connection to interstate commerce. First, the text of the bill triggers
federal jurisdiction when the victim or defendant commits the crime
69
after traveling across state lines.
Second, jurisdiction is triggered
whenever the defendant uses a “channel, facility, or instrumentality of
70
interstate or foreign commerce” in connection with the crime.
Third, federal prosecutors may establish jurisdiction by proving that
any weapon used by the defendant passed through interstate com68
69
70

S. 1105 § 2(6).
Id. § 7(a) (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(i)).
Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
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71

merce at some point. Next, federal jurisdiction will be appropriate
when prosecutors can establish that a bias-motivated crime of violence
interferes with economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the
72
time of the offense. Finally, federal jurisdiction will be appropriate if
the prosecutors can somehow establish that the crime “otherwise af73
fects interstate . . . commerce.”
C. Debate Surrounding the Matthew Shepard Act
The Matthew Shepard Act has drawn criticism from an exceptionally wide range of sources. Even the basic question of whether hate
crimes should be subject to enhanced penalties is extremely controversial and generates significant debate in state legislatures across the
74
country. The Matthew Shepard Act, however, is more controversial
than standard state hate crime statutes for two reasons. First, because
the Matthew Shepard Act would add sexual orientation and gender
71

Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iii)).
Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)).
73
Id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II)). This language signifies Congress’s intent to exercise the full authority of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000) (holding that the language “any activity affecting . . . commerce” demonstrates Congress’s intent to invoke its full authority
under the Commerce Clause); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226
(1963) (establishing that the words “affecting commerce” indicate Congress’s intention to exercise jurisdiction to the full limits of the Commerce Clause).
74
See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY
POLITICS 29, 29-44 (1998), as reprinted in ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 839-48 (describing the differences that exist among the states regarding the punishment of biasmotivated crimes). Supporters of heavier punishments for bias-motivated crimes claim
that these crimes are more harmful to both the individual and society than an equivalent crime that is not motivated by bias. In fact, in upholding a state’s imposition of
extra punishments for crimes motivated by bias, the Supreme Court identified three
ways in which these crimes create greater harms than their non-bias-motivated counterparts: “[B]ias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict
distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.” Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488 (1993). Opponents of enhanced punishments for hate
crimes note the imprecision in any measure of a defendant’s motivation for committing a crime and argue that in any given case it is extremely difficult to identify exactly
what a defendant’s motivation may have been. See Baker, supra note 67, at 1209-11.
Conditioning a defendant’s sentence on a factual question that is extremely difficult to
conclusively determine contravenes the legality principle, which requires criminal laws
to be both clear and determinate. See id. at 1213-14. In addition, opponents argue
that it is the underlying offense that causes harm to the victim, not the mental state of
the perpetrator. See id. at 1215 (“The concept of ‘hate’ as harm, however, actually has
little, if anything, to do with the harm to particular victims.”). To condition punishment on the beliefs of the perpetrator may lead to different punishment for the same
harmful conduct. See id. at 1211-12.
72
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identity to the existing federal bias-crime laws as protected classes,
many see this bill as an effort to give special protections to those
75
classes.
Second, because the bill would eliminate the federallyprotected-activity requirement and create federal jurisdiction over a
much broader area of criminal conduct traditionally left to the states,
many opponents see it as an intrusion into the residual state sovereignty guaranteed by the federal system established by the Constitu76
tion.
Noting that the protection of citizens through the police power is
77
one of the core areas of traditional state concern, those who object
to the bill on federalism grounds make a number of arguments
against federal hate crime laws. First, some have argued that federal
criminal law introduces complexities into the administration of justice
that otherwise do not exist under state law and therefore makes the
78
criminal justice system less effective. For example, because of the
constitutionally mandated jurisdictional elements present in most
federal criminal statutes, a prosecution under federal law is often
much more complex than the same prosecution at the state level. In
addition, fair prosecution is more difficult because federal officials are
often far removed from local conditions, which may be particularly
relevant in the context of a hate crime case because societal perceptions play such a key role in evaluating the existence of bias motivation. This complexity increases the costs of the prosecution and often
makes it more difficult to convict a defendant of a federal offense.
In addition to the complexities introduced by a federal prosecution, many opponents of federal hate crime legislation assert that fed-

75

See, e.g., Peter Sprigg, Op-Ed., Reject the ‘Hate Crimes’ Bill; The Mythology Behind
Matthew Shepard, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A19 (drawing a parallel between the
murder of Matthew Shepard and that of Cindy Dixon, the mother of one of Shepard’s
killers, and arguing that the Matthew Shepard Act would entitle Shepard to greater
protection under federal law than it would Dixon).
76
Cf., e.g., Baker, supra note 67, at 1215-21 (arguing that any federal hate crime
statute passed by Congress will most likely face significant challenges in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison).
77
Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (“The regulation and
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States. . . . Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”).
78
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 67, at 1194-99 (arguing that state prosecutions are
preferable to federal prosecutions because of the increased complexity involved with
federal cases).
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eral prosecution is unnecessary because most states have laws that
adequately cover the underlying offense and provide enhanced penal79
ties for bias motivation. In fact, the Statement of Administration Policy issued by the executive branch after passage of the House version
of the Matthew Shepard Act in 2007 expresses the President’s position
80
that the Matthew Shepard Act is “unnecessary.”
In so doing, the
statement argues that
[t]here has been no persuasive demonstration of any need to federalize
such a potentially large range of violent crime enforcement, and doing
so is inconsistent with the proper allocation of criminal enforcement responsibilities between the different levels of government. In addition,
almost every State in the country can actively prosecute hate crimes un81
der the State’s own hate crimes law.

Importantly, despite the push to enact federal hate crime laws that
grew out of the murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., all
of the defendants in these two cases were convicted in state court and
sentenced to either life in prison or death without the assistance of a
82
federal law.
Finally, many argue that congressional support for federal hate
crime laws comes more from a desire by members to express disgust
for bigoted attitudes than from any perceived problem in state crimi83
nal justice systems. In making this argument, commentators note
that many of the federal criminal laws passed in recent years have

79

See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 38.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Russell Henderson and Aaron McKinney both pled guilty to kidnapping and
murder charges and received two consecutive life sentences for the murder of Matthew
Shepard. Tiffany Edwards, Gay Man’s Murderer Sentenced to Life, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 5,
1999, at A24; Man Gets 2 Life Terms in Gay Student’s Death; Defendant Pleaded Guilty in
Wyoming Case, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 6, 1999, at A2. In giving him that sentence, the
state judge told Henderson that he “deserv[ed] the fullest punishment [the] court can
mete out.” Id. John William King and Lawrence Russell Brewer both received death
sentences for the murder of James Byrd, Jr. Lee Hancock, Racist to Die For Killing; Victim’s Kin Hail Sentence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1A. Shawn Allen
Berry was given a life sentence for his part in the Byrd murder. Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, 3rd Defendant Gets Life Sentence in Jasper Man’s Dragging Death, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 19, 1999, at 1A. The families and communities of the victims indicated
that they were satisfied with the punishments in both of these cases. See Edwards, supra
(quoting Matthew Shepard’s father as praising the jury for its guilty verdicts in Aaron
McKinney’s case); Charisse Jones, Sentence Sits Well With Texas Town, USA TODAY, Feb.
26, 1999, at 3A (reporting that after learning of King’s death sentence, “no one [in Jasper, Texas] disagreed that justice had been done”).
83
See Baker, supra note 67, at 1214.
80
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84

gone largely unprosecuted. In fact, because criminal prosecutions
85
under the Federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) were so
rare, the case in which the Supreme Court ultimately declared the law
86
unconstitutional came in the context of a civil action for damages.
Prosecutions under the Matthew Shepard Act will likely be similarly
rare, leading some opponents to conclude that Congress is more concerned with winning the favor of voters or sending a symbolic message
87
than with remedying a problem of state prosecutions. Regardless of
its source, the bipartisan support that the Matthew Shepard Act has
received in Congress indicates that federal legislators will most likely
pass the bill in the near future. The intense and widespread criticism
generated by the Matthew Shepard Act ensures that once it is passed,
those representing individuals prosecuted under it will be prepared to
challenge the bill’s constitutionality.
II. MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
One of the major constitutional challenges to the Matthew
Shepard Act will be that it exceeds Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause. Whether or not the bill is within Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce is a question that must be analyzed
within the framework announced in the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez. Lopez set out a general framework for
evaluating Commerce Clause cases, and reinterpreted the Court’s past
cases to fit within this framework. Because the Court’s subsequent decisions in United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich indicate that
future Commerce Clause cases will continue to be decided within Lopez’s framework, this Comment does not attempt to give a detailed
88
presentation of the doctrine’s historical development. Instead, this

84

See id. at 1215 (claiming that many recently enacted federal criminal laws go unprosecuted because the federal court system could not handle the consistent enforcement of these laws due to the volume of federal criminal laws passed since the 1970s).
85
Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
86
Baker, supra note 67, at 1215.
87
See id.; see also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2028
(2008) (describing the factors that lead to underprosecution of federal criminal laws
and arguing that the “optional nature” of these laws makes them “useful vehicles for
sending symbolic messages”).
88
For a good general description of the history of Commerce Clause doctrine, see
Arthur B. Mark, III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32
CAP. U. L. REV. 671, 673-89 (2004).
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Part will discuss the modern doctrine as presented in Lopez and devel89
oped in Morrison and Raich.
A. The Lopez Framework
As explained in Lopez, Congress traditionally has had the power to
regulate three broad areas under the Commerce Clause: first, Con90
gress may regulate “the channels of interstate commerce”; second,
91
Congress may regulate “persons or things in interstate commerce”;
and third, Congress may regulate activities that “substantially affect in92
terstate commerce.”
The modern debate over the limits of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause has centered on this third
category of regulation, and the primary contribution of Lopez has been
to provide a framework for determining when an activity substantially
affects interstate commerce.
Under Lopez, the Court must perform a two-step inquiry when
evaluating a law under the substantial-effects test. First, the Court
must determine whether the activity regulated is economic activity. If
the activity regulated is economic, the Court will be highly deferential
to Congress’s determination that it substantially affects interstate
93
commerce and will most likely uphold the regulation. If the Court
determines that the activity regulated is not economic, the Court will
be less deferential, considering three factors to determine whether
the regulation is within congressional power: (1) whether the statute
contains a jurisdictional element limiting its reach to activities affect94
ing interstate commerce; (2) whether Congress has offered any find89

Most discussions of Commerce Clause doctrine treat the subject historically, detailing the original direct-effects test used prior to 1937, the development and refinement of the substantial-effects test from 1937 to United States v. Lopez in 1995, and assessing the changes resulting from Lopez and more recent Commerce Clause cases. See,
e.g., Hasenstab, supra note 16, at 978-85. While this is a reasonable approach to take, it
is not the most helpful in performing an analysis under the Commerce Clause. Because Lopez reinterpreted without overruling any particular case, the Court’s past cases
have the meaning that Lopez ascribes to them rather than the meaning they originally
may have carried.
90
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 559.
93
See id. at 560 (“These examples are by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is
clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.”).
94
See id. at 561 (concluding that the GFSZA contains no such jurisdictional element); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (noting that the
Violence Against Women Act contains no jurisdictional element).
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ings showing the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce;
and (3) whether the statute is a necessary part of a larger regulation of
96
economic activity.
In two cases decided after Lopez—United States v. Morrison and Gonzales v. Raich—the Supreme Court expanded on its analysis of the second and third of these factors. In Morrison the Court discussed the
impact that congressional findings have on a statute’s constitutional97
ity, and in Raich the Court identified a situation where a law could be
98
considered part of a larger regulation of economic activity.
The
Court has not yet taken the opportunity to decide a case clarifying the
impact that a jurisdictional element would have on a statute’s constitutionality, but, as we will see below, the Matthew Shepard Act, if
passed, could give the Court an excellent opportunity to expand on
the doctrine in this area. For now, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich each add
to, and build upon, the Supreme Court’s new Commerce Clause doctrine and therefore deserve separate attention.
B. United States v. Lopez
Lopez involved the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a
federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
99
school zone.” In striking down the regulation, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, noted
that “if § 922(q) [were] to be sustained, it must be under the third
category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects inter-

95

See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (observing that Congress, in support of VAWA,
made “numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (noting the absence of
congressional findings regarding the effects of gun possession in a school zone on interstate commerce).
96
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2005) (distinguishing the Controlled
Substances Act, part of a broad regulatory scheme, from the more narrow statutes at
issue in Lopez and Morrison); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (designating the GFSZA as a criminal statute not part of a comprehensive regulation of economic activity); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (explaining that the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 serves a wide and important regulatory function).
97
529 U.S. at 614-15; see also infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
98
545 U.S. at 23-25; see also infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
99
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, amended by
Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat.
3009-314, 3009-369 to -370 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006)).
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100

state commerce.” After introducing its new framework for analyzing
101
substantial-effects-test cases, the Court found that the statute contained no jurisdictional element that would limit its scope, included
no congressional findings showing its connection to interstate commerce, and was not an essential part of a larger regulation of eco102
nomic activity.
Also significant to the Court was the fact that the
GFSZA tended to create a federal police power over areas traditionally
103
subject only to state control.
Because § 922(q) regulated noneconomic activity, the Court declared it to be outside of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause when examined in light of the
104
three factors.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice
O’Connor. Although he counseled that the Court must show “great
restraint” before declaring an act of Congress invalid under the
105
Commerce Clause, Justice Kennedy indicated that he voted to overturn the law because Congress had intruded into an area of regulation
106
traditionally controlled by the states.
He argued that when Congress attempts to regulate conduct that has only an attenuated effect
on interstate commerce, the Court should “inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional
107
state concern.”
Allowing the federal government to control publicschool grounds would prevent states from acting as “laboratories for
108
experimentation” in order to test new policy choices.
Even so, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence indicated that he was willing to allow significant intrusions on state sovereignty, but not without a closer link to
109
commerce. Also concurring, Justice Thomas expressed his opinion
that the substantial-effects test has no basis in the Constitution and
110
could lead to a federal police power over all areas of life.
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer all authored dissenting opinions, expressing their belief that the majority opinion significantly de100

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
102
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
103
See id. at 561 n.3 (emphasizing that the states hold primary authority over
criminal law enforcement).
104
Id. at 559-63.
105
Id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106
Id. at 580.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 581.
109
Id. at 583.
110
Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101
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parted from the Court’s prior Commerce Clause doctrine. Justice
Souter argued that, under the Court’s prior holdings, Congress
should receive great deference, and that the Court should uphold
laws enacted under the Commerce Clause as long as Congress had a
rational basis for finding that the regulated activity affected interstate
111
commerce.
Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, agreed, and attempted to show that the GFSZA
passed rational basis review because guns affect education, and the
quality of the education that children receive will determine future
112
American economic success.
Justice Stevens wrote separately to express his agreement with Justices Souter and Breyer, and to argue that
because Congress has the power to eliminate the market for guns
generally, it also has the power to eliminate that market among
113
school-age children.
Dissenting opinions notwithstanding, the Court in Lopez voted,
five to four, to strike down a law enacted under the Commerce Clause
for the first time in nearly sixty years. In so doing, it set out a new
framework for analyzing substantial-effects-test cases and identified
three factors to consider when determining whether a law actually
regulates an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Although it developed this framework, Lopez did not provide much
guidance as to how the factors should be weighed in any given situation because the GFSZA satisfied none of the three factors. The Court
left to future cases the task of defining the extent to which each of the
three factors would weigh in favor of, or against, upholding a challenged law.
C. United States v. Morrison
The next major development in the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence came in 2000, with United States v. Morrison. Morrison involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision of
VAWA, which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender114
motivated violence.
As in Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. In order to satisfy the threshold inquiry of
111

Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 619-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113
Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1914 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (Supp. V 2005)).
112
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Lopez, the Court first established that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of
115
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Because VAWA did not involve economic activity, the Court turned to
Lopez’s three factors to determine whether the law actually regulated
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Like the GFSZA, VAWA contained no jurisdictional element limiting its reach and was clearly not a necessary piece of any larger regula116
tion of economic activity.
The statute, however, did contain extensive findings about the impact of gender-motivated violence on
117
interstate commerce.
Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce “by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce . . . [as well as] by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of
118
and the demand for interstate products.”
The first question raised by these findings was whether their mere
presence—the simple fact that Congress listed findings showing a
connection to interstate commerce—would be enough to satisfy Lopez.
In answering this question, the Supreme Court first established that
whether an activity affects interstate commerce substantially enough
to give Congress the power to regulate it is a judicial, rather than a
119
legislative, question.
Consequently, Congress’s findings that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce are not sufficient, by
120
themselves, to sustain a law enacted under the Commerce Clause.
The first lesson of Morrison is, therefore, that the Lopez factors are not
121
a “drafting guide” for laws enacted under the Commerce Clause. In
other words, it is not the fact that Congress has included findings that
115

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
Id.
117
Id. at 614.
118
Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853); accord S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (“Genderbased crime[] . . . restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases
health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate
commerce and the national economy.”).
119
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (“[W]hether particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by this Court.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964))).
120
Id.
121
Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 46 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
116
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will weigh in favor of upholding the law, but rather the extent to
which, in the Court’s judgment, the activity actually affects interstate
commerce.
Having established that the mere presence of congressional findings would not support VAWA, the Court next moved on to analyze
the extent to which gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce. The Court ultimately rejected Congress’s findings, holding
that the link they established between gender-motivated violent crime
and interstate commerce was too attenuated to conclude that this type
122
of violence substantially affects interstate commerce.
In so doing,
the Court expressed its concern that the type of reasoning employed
by Congress—“follow[ing] the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been
the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect
123
upon interstate commerce” —would allow Congress to use the
Commerce Clause to destroy “the Constitution’s distinction between
124
national and local authority.”
Thus, the second lesson of Morrison is that the Court will look
skeptically at regulations that tend to destroy all distinction between
national and local authority, and thereby give Congress a type of plenary power to legislate. This is what has been called the “non-infinity
principle,” which is “the principle that any accepted theory of the
Commerce Clause resulting in a virtually unlimited source of governmental power must be invalid” because it would “undermine the very
125
notion of enumerated powers.”
The Court seemed to emphasize
the importance of this principle in Morrison when it rejected Congress’s findings, concluding that if it were to accept Congress’s reasoning that an activity’s distant and indirect impact on the economy
could be a basis for legislation, there would be no reason that Congress could not regulate other types of violent crime, family law, or
126
even murder.
Morrison therefore seems to indicate that whenever
Congress tries to claim an unlimited power to legislate, particularly in

122

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17.
Id. at 615.
124
Id.
125
Reynolds & Denning, supra note 15, at 376-78; see also David B. Kopel & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30
CONN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1997) (developing the concept of the “non-infinity principle” and
defining it as the principle that “for a Commerce Clause rationale to be acceptable under
Lopez, it must not be a rationale that would allow Congress to legislate on everything”).
126
529 U.S. at 615-16.
123
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areas traditionally regulated by the states, the Court will be extremely
hesitant to uphold the legislation.
D. Gonzales v. Raich
The most recent case involving Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause was the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Gonzales
v. Raich. In Raich the Court upheld the portion of the Controlled
127
Substances Act (CSA) that prohibited the possession or cultivation
of marijuana. The plaintiffs sought to prevent enforcement of the
CSA’s restrictions against their use of marijuana for medicinal pur128
poses, which California law permitted. While the CSA contained no
jurisdictional restriction or congressional findings dealing with marijuana use for medicinal purposes, the Court upheld its ban because
allowing medicinal marijuana use could undercut the CSA’s effective129
ness. The Court applied the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Fil130
burn, finding that Congress could have rationally believed that the
prohibition against medical marijuana was an essential part of a larger
131
regulation of economic activity.
In so doing, the Court expanded
on Lopez’s third factor, and provided some explanation about when a
regulation will be upheld as being necessary to a larger economic
regulation.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. For Justice Stevens, the central question was whether Congress had a rational basis
for concluding that this regulation was an essential part of a larger
132
regulatory scheme.
Because Congress could have rationally concluded that the allowance of intrastate drug use would hinder its ability to eliminate the interstate drug market, the Court upheld Con133
gress’s action.

127

Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202, 84 Stat. 1242, 1249 (1970) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006)).
128
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
129
Id. at 26-27.
130
See 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”).
131
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
132
Id. at 26.
133
Id.
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It is important to note the subtle difference between the rational
basis review of Raich and the rational basis review applied in past Com134
merce Clause cases such as Katzenbach v. McClung and Heart of Atlanta
135
Motel, Inc. v. United States.
Morrison rejected the claim that for a statute to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause the Court simply
had to determine that Congress had a rational basis for believing that
136
the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce.
Although seen by some as a return to pre-Lopez rational basis review of
137
Commerce Clause cases, the Court in Raich applied rational basis review to Congress’s determination that control of intrastate activity was
necessary to make its larger regulatory scheme effective. Rather than
giving Congress carte blanche in the Commerce Clause, this distinction serves to reinforce Lopez’s claim that the Commerce Clause will in
fact be a limited grant of authority to Congress because the Court will
only reach rational basis review after it is satisfied that the larger regulatory scheme is valid under the Commerce Clause. Following Raich,
therefore, the Court must first apply the Lopez framework to the larger
regulation to determine if it is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. If the regulatory scheme covers economic
activity, it will be valid under Lopez and the Court can move on to decide whether the narrower regulation of intrastate activity is necessary.
In making this subsequent determination, the Court will apply
rational basis review, and will be deferential to Congress’s decision to

134

379 U.S. 294 (1964).
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
136
Although McClung, 379 U.S. at 304, and Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 26162, employ this type of rational basis review, it has been rejected by the Court’s modern cases. But, in order to maintain the outcomes of these cases, Lopez cites to them as
representative of decisions upholding statutes regulating economic activity. United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
137
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005) (regarding Raich as a repudiation of the
doctrines espoused in Lopez and Morrison); Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell,
Letter to the Editors, Gonzales v. Raich, the “Comprehensive Scheme” Principle, and the
Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTL. L. 491, 497 (2005) (suggesting
that Lopez and Morrison were deviations in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
rather than indications of a federalism revolution); Mollie Lee, Note, Environmental
Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456, 468
(2006) (“One way to understand Raich is as a retreat from the Court’s new Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, and thus reading Lopez and Morrison as mere aberrations.”). But
cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 884 (2005) (“[I]t is impossible to determine
whether the majority or the dissent correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison standards,
because they are so malleable as to justify either result.”).
135
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include even intrastate, non-economic activity as long as there is a rational basis for doing so. Because the Court will not engage in rational basis review until after it has applied the Lopez framework to the
parent regulation, Raich clearly does not signal a return to the preLopez framework.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence makes this point clear. Justice Scalia
concurred in the judgment, but, unlike the majority, he believed that
the power to regulate purely intrastate activities that are essential
pieces of a larger regulation of economic activity derived from the
138
Necessary and Proper Clause. For Justice Scalia, Congress can regulate intrastate non-economic activity when it is necessary or proper to
regulate in order to make effective a larger regulation of interstate
139
economic activity.
The Court must determine “whether the means
chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end
140
under the commerce power.”
Thus, while Congress could not regulate these activities under the Commerce Clause alone, the Necessary
and Proper Clause allowed Congress to regulate them in order to make
the CSA effective. For Justice Scalia, the key question is whether the
larger statutory scheme is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause
power to regulate economic activity, and Lopez provides the test for this.
E. Themes of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich
It seems that the central message of Lopez, reinforced by Morrison,
is that the Court will once again enforce the outer limits of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause rather than allowing the
Clause to serve as the grant of general legislative power that it had become in the previous decades. As then-Judge Alito noted in a dissenting opinion issued soon after Lopez was decided, “if Lopez means anything, it is that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause must
141
have some limits.”
Consistent with this interpretation, the Court in
Morrison resisted Congress’s attempt to circumvent the limited grant
of power that is the Commerce Clause by issuing findings that showed
only an attenuated connection between gender-motivated violent
crime and interstate commerce. Morrison makes clear that Congress

138

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves
part of interstate commerce . . . derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
139
Raich, 545 U.S. at 37.
140
Id.
141
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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may not claim the power to regulate everything simply by its use of
“magic words” that will insulate the statute from constitutional attack.
It also indicated that the Court will approach with skepticism congressional regulations that have the effect of eliminating any distinction
between the powers of the federal government and those reserved to
the states.
Another recurring theme is the Court’s resistance to allowing
Congress to regulate areas traditionally controlled by the states. In
Lopez the Court expressed concern that the GFSZA encroached on
both the states’ traditional police powers and their authority to regu142
late education. Similarly, in Morrison the Court discussed extensively
its concern that upholding VAWA could give Congress the power to
regulate traditional areas of state regulation, such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and every type of violent crime—including mur143
der. In fact, one important distinguishing characteristic of the CSA
in Raich is that because Congress has always had the power to regulate
controlled substances, upholding the intrastate ban on marijuana, at
least to the majority, posed no threat to any traditional area of state
144
control.
So, while not specifically presented by Lopez as a factor, all
three cases make clear that the Court will seek to protect the areas of
regulation traditionally associated with state control from overreaching by Congress.
Even after Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, the Court still has not addressed the first of the Lopez factors: a situation in which a statute
must survive or fail on the strength of its jurisdictional element. Jurisdictional elements, however, have been a primary tool in Congress’s
arsenal as it attempts to design statutes that regulate broad areas not
directly associated with economic activity. These elements have therefore been the subject of some confusion among courts and interest
145
among scholars.
The final piece in the Lopez line of modern Com-

142

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000).
144
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 10-15 (discussing the history of the CSA and noting that
Congress regulated controlled substances as early as 1906).
145
See Susanna Frederick Fischer, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Disagreement
Among the Federal Circuits over Whether Federal Law Criminalizing the Intrastate Possession of
Child Pornography Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NEXUS 99, 101-02 (2005) (noting that
“[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions have placed federal courts of appeals in an impossible situation when ruling on Commerce Clause challenges to [certain types of jurisdictional elements,]” but that the Supreme Court “has not yet provided clear guidance
as to the meaning of economic or commercial, nor has it overruled prior precedent
that seems clearly inconsistent with this limitation”); Stuckey, supra note 40, at 2104-05
143
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merce Clause cases would therefore appear to be a case addressing
the impact and sufficiency of jurisdictional elements. Once the Court
addresses this last Lopez factor, the basic contours of the modern
Commerce Clause framework will be complete. As will be seen below,
because of its similarity to VAWA, which was at issue in Morrison, the
Matthew Shepard Act may provide the Court with the best possible
opportunity to isolate the effect of a jurisdictional element and bring
clarity to this area of the law. An analysis of the Matthew Shepard Act
under Lopez, then, becomes important not only for the fate of the bill
itself, but also as a predictor of the Supreme Court’s potential treatment of jurisdictional-element questions more generally.
III. ANALYSIS UNDER THE LOPEZ FRAMEWORK
At the outset, Morrison indicates that a prohibition against violent
crime motivated by gender or other characteristics regulates neither
the channels of interstate commerce nor persons or things in interstate commerce. Therefore, if the Matthew Shepard Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause it must be because bias-motivated crimes have a substantial effect on interstate
146
147
commerce.
Because the bill does not regulate economic activity,
the Court must consider the three Lopez factors: (1) whether the bill
contains congressional findings attempting to show the regulated activity’s effect on interstate commerce; (2) whether the regulation provided by the bill is a necessary part of a larger regulation of economic
activity; and (3) whether the bill contains a jurisdictional element that
would limit its reach to activities that substantially affect interstate
148
commerce.
According to Morrison, congressional findings will only support
the constitutionality of a statute if the connection between the regu-

(describing the confusion courts have faced when analyzing jurisdictional elements after
Raich and suggesting possible ways in which the courts should deal with these elements).
146
Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (recounting Lopez’s three-factor analysis and finding that the issue of gender-motivated violence must fall under the substantial-effect
prong); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (finding that legislation regulating the possession of a
handgun near schools is neither a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce nor an attempt to regulate the transport of an item through the channels of
commerce, and that it therefore can only be justified if it has a substantial effect on
commerce).
147
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (holding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”).
148
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
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149

lated activity and interstate commerce is not too attenuated. In Morrison, the Court noted the presence of congressional findings attempting to show the connection between gender-motivated violence and
interstate commerce:
Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce “by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce; . . . by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and de150
creasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.”

The Court ultimately rejected Congress’s findings because the reasoning it advanced, following “the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been
the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce,” would give Congress unlimited author151
ity.
As noted above, Morrison reinforced the Court’s resistance to
any type of “magic words” that could give Congress unlimited authority simply by their inclusion.
The findings contained within section 2 of the Matthew Shepard
Act are very similar to those present in VAWA. Central to Congress’s
findings in the bill is the claim that hate crimes impede the movement
of targeted groups and prevent members of such groups from engag152
ing in interstate commerce. Because in Morrison the Court held that
a similar connection between gender-motivated violent crime and interstate commerce was too attenuated to support VAWA, the findings
present in the Matthew Shepard Act will also likely be insufficient to
sustain it.
It is also clear that the Matthew Shepard Act is not a necessary part
of a larger regulation of economic activity. Of the three recent Commerce Clause cases, only Raich involved a prohibition that was part of
a larger regulatory framework. In that case, the prohibition on intrastate, noncommercial possession of marijuana was necessary because
the absence of such regulation would undercut the CSA’s attempt to
eliminate the interstate market in illegal drugs. However, the Court
in Morrison held that VAWA was not a necessary part of a larger regu-

149

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853).
151
Id.
152
S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 2(6) (2007).
150
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lation of economic activity, presumably because there is no interstate
153
market for gender-motivated violence.
Like VAWA, the Matthew
Shepard Act seeks to claim federal jurisdiction over crimes motivated
by gender, among other classifications. Because it held that VAWA
was not part of a larger regulation of economic activity, the Court will
likely hold that the Matthew Shepard Act is similarly not part of a lar154
ger regulatory scheme.
The primary difference between the laws at issue in the three
modern Commerce Clause cases and the Matthew Shepard Act is the
presence of a jurisdictional element attempting to limit the reach of
the bill to conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce. In
fact, without this jurisdictional element the bill is remarkably similar
to VAWA, and the Court would most likely declare the law unconstitutional on similar grounds. The effectiveness of this jurisdictional element will therefore likely determine the constitutionality of the bill.
In fact, because the Matthew Shepard Act is so similar to VAWA—
from its congressional findings to the type of conduct regulated—a
case challenging the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard Act
would present the Court with an excellent opportunity to clarify the
Lopez framework with regard to jurisdictional elements. Since the bill
is clearly unconstitutional without the jurisdictional element, such a
case would allow the Court to isolate the effect of the jurisdictional
element and speak directly to this issue. Also, because the particular
jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act contains every type
155
of jurisdictional-element prong used by Congress, the Court would
have the opportunity to assess thoroughly the impact of each. The
153

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (distinguishing Raich and Morrison
on the ground that the CSA regulated quintessentially economic activity such as “production, distribution, and consumption,” while VAWA regulated activity that was more
criminal than economic).
154
Interestingly, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Raich expressed concern that the Court’s decision in that case would allow Congress to claim unlimited
authority by regulating broadly. Id. at 46-47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But, the analysis above shows that, at least in the case of intrastate, non-economic, criminal law, Raich
is not the carte blanche that Justice O’Connor feared. It is true that Congress could
insert findings stating that jurisdiction over intrastate bias-motivated crimes is necessary for some larger regulatory purpose. In that case, it becomes especially important
for the Court to remember the lesson of Lopez and Morrison and continue to enforce
the limits of the Commerce Clause. For now, however, the Matthew Shepard Act contains no such findings and is clearly not part of a larger economic regulation.
155
The particular jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act contains at
least five independent bases for federal prosecutors to claim jurisdiction. See S. 1105,
110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B) (2007). For a discussion of these provisions, see supra notes
67-73 and accompanying text.
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remainder of this Comment will conduct this analysis based on the
decisions of many of the courts of appeals applying Lopez, Morrison,
and Raich.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL-ELEMENT ANALYSIS
A jurisdictional element exists to limit the reach of a statute to a
discrete set of activities that “have an explicit connection with or effect
156
on interstate commerce.” It may do this either by bringing the activity out of the realm of the substantial-effects test—by ensuring that the
statute regulates only the channels of interstate commerce or persons
or things in interstate commerce—or by guaranteeing, through caseby-case inquiry, that the activity in question substantially affects inter157
state commerce. For a jurisdictional element to ensure that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the key question is whether proof of the jurisdictional element also proves that the
regulated activity has a connection to interstate commerce. When
analyzing the jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act, the
Supreme Court would have to address two questions for the first time:
(1) whether the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is sufficient
to sustain a statute’s constitutionality; and (2) if not, how significant a
restriction must a statute place on the class of activities reached in order to be sufficient.
A. Mere Presence of a Jurisdictional Element
Nearly every federal court of appeals that has considered the question has held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is not
158
sufficient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality.
Only the Eighth
Circuit has held that an element’s mere presence is sufficient for a
159
statute to survive a facial challenge under the Commerce Clause.
156

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
See id. at 561-62 (finding that the GFSZA was solely a criminal statute with no
jurisdictional element to confine its reach to activity that affects interstate commerce);
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the Lopez framework
and finding that a federal statute regulating the possession of child pornography qualifies as an activity that has a substantial relation to interstate commerce).
158
See Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-19 (describing holdings of the courts of appeals that have considered this question).
159
United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit, however, seems to have
backed away from this bright-line rule in subsequent cases. In its most recent Commerce Clause cases the court describes its holding in Bausch as standing for the propo157
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Meanwhile, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all held that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is insufficient to guarantee the constitutionality of a statute un160
der the Commerce Clause.
The cases dealing with the constitutionality of federal statutes
161
criminalizing the possession of child pornography illustrate how the
courts of appeals have ruled on this question. Although most circuits
have upheld these statutes, they have done so on grounds similar to
Raich, reasoning that prohibiting the intrastate possession of child
pornography is necessary to eliminate the interstate commercial mar162
ket for it. In the course of their analyses, however, these courts have
often assessed the impact of these statutes’ jurisdictional elements,
helping to illuminate the ways in which the Supreme Court might assess the issues presented by these elements.
The federal child pornography statutes make it a crime to possess
or manufacture child pornography that “has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which
was produced by using materials which have been mailed or so
163
shipped or transported.”
When analyzing these statutes for their
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, courts are faced with
the initial question of whether the mere presence of these jurisdictional elements is sufficient to sustain the laws.
sition that the particular jurisdictional element at issue sufficiently limited the reach of
federal jurisdiction, rather than that every jurisdictional element does so. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1020-22 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing Bausch as
holding that “the statute’s express jurisdictional element, which limits prosecution to
cases in which the depictions or the underlying materials had been transported in interstate commerce, ensured that each defendant’s pornography possession affected
interstate commerce” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160
Fischer, supra note 145, at 118.
161
These laws include two statutes prohibiting the possession of pornographic images of children, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2006), as well as one prohibiting its manufacture, id. § 2251.
162
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It
is well within Congress’s authority to regulate directly the commercial activities constituting the interstate market for child pornography, and [p]rohibiting the intrastate
possession . . . of an article of commerce is a rational . . . means of regulating commerce in that product.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 705 (2006); United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 10 (1st
Cir. 2004); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2000).
163
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); see also id. § 2251(b) (prohibiting the manufacture of child pornography “if that visual depiction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means”).
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Of the courts of appeals that have considered these laws, only the
Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Bausch, has apparently held that the
mere presence of this jurisdictional element establishes the constitu164
tionality of these laws.
In that case, the court stated that the presence of any jurisdictional element guarantees the constitutionality of a
statute because a jurisdictional element forces courts to conduct a
case-by-case inquiry into the defendant’s conduct to establish that it
165
substantially affects interstate commerce.
But when examining the
law in that case, the court stopped short of analyzing whether the particular element in the statute did in fact ensure that the defendant’s
conduct substantially affected interstate commerce, apparently resting
its holding on the belief that all jurisdictional elements guarantee
such a connection.
When considering the same statute in United States v. Rodia, however, the Third Circuit refused to allow the mere presence of the jurisdictional element in the child pornography statutes to establish
their constitutionality and therefore took the further step of inquiring
166
whether the particular element sufficiently fulfilled its task.
The
court relied on its earlier decision in United States v. Bishop, in which it
expressly held that “[t]he mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . . does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scru167
tiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.”
In Bishop the Third Circuit had rejected the government’s argument
that the presence of a jurisdictional element automatically rendered
the statute constitutional because it required the government to prove
in every case beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking victim’s car
had been “transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign
168
commerce.”
Although the court ultimately determined that the
element did indeed guarantee a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce, it expressly held that the courts must test the sufficiency of
169
a jurisdictional element.
Adopting the reasoning of Bishop, the Third Circuit similarly held
that a court must test a jurisdictional element to determine whether it

164
165
166
167
168
169

Bausch, 140 F.3d at 741.
Id.
194 F.3d 465, 472-73 (3d Cir. 1999).
66 F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)).
See id.
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170

The court

[a] hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element
automatically ensures the constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact
that the connection between the activity regulated and the jurisdictional
hook may be so attenuated as to fail to guarantee that the activity regu171
lated has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Although it preceded Morrison, this language is reminiscent of that
case’s holding that congressional findings showing a link between an
activity and interstate commerce will not support a challenged law if,
172
in the court’s judgment, the connection is too attenuated. In Morrison, rather than allow the mere presence of congressional findings to
guarantee a statute’s constitutionality, the Court held that judges must
examine the actual connection between the activity and interstate
173
commerce to determine if there is a substantial connection.
The
Court expressed concern that congressional power to reason from an
activity to its most attenuated and indirect effect on interstate commerce could “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between na174
tional and local authority.”
The Rodia court saw a similar risk in allowing Congress to reach
activities outside its power by including a jurisdictional element that
175
did not sufficiently guarantee a connection to interstate commerce.
To avoid this risk, the court held that the sufficiency of a jurisdictional
176
element is likewise a question to be decided by the courts.
In fact,
unlike Bishop, the court in Rodia indicated its belief that the jurisdictional element of the child pornography statutes was unconstitutionally broad because it did not limit the class of cases available to federal
177
jurisdiction to those that substantially affect interstate commerce.
In declaring the jurisdictional element to be insufficiently limiting,
the court expressed concern that the element did not actually limit
federal jurisdiction at all because nearly all child pornographers will

170

Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472 (quoting Bishop, 66 F.3d at 585).
Id.
172
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
173
Id. at 614-15.
174
Id. at 615.
175
See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473.
176
Id. at 472.
177
See id. at 473. Although the court expressed its opinion that the jurisdictional
element was unconstitutionally broad, it did not so hold because it upheld the statute
on other grounds.
171
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use some materials—like floppy disks, film, or cameras—that have
178
traveled in interstate commerce. In the court’s opinion, such broad
coverage opened up the risk that Congress could use this type of jurisdictional element to reach cases with only an attenuated connection
to interstate commerce.
In the cases decided since, the Third Circuit’s reasoning has uni179
formly prevailed.
In fact, although the Eighth Circuit has repeat180
edly reaffirmed Bausch after Morrison, it seems to have backed away
from Bausch’s bright-line rule that every jurisdictional element will
guarantee a connection to interstate commerce. In the most recent
cases, the court has indicated that Bausch instead rested on the conclusion that the particular jurisdictional element of the child pornography statutes guaranteed the requisite nexus to interstate com181
merce.
Rather than concluding simply that the presence of any
jurisdictional element must guarantee such a connection, even the
178

Id.
See Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-19 (noting that the Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have preferred the approach taken in Rodia).
Fischer notes that an unreported Fourth Circuit case seems to have adopted the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning and that the First Circuit also seems to have done so before
Morrison. Id. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, however, simply refers to the fact that
other courts have held the jurisdictional element to be sufficient, without providing
much analysis with regard to the question of the reasons for those courts’ holdings. See
United States v. Harden, No. 01-7869, 2002 WL 2004854, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2002)
(per curiam) (“The circuits that have addressed [the constitutionality of
§ 2252(a)(4)(B)] are in agreement that the statute is constitutional on its face.”).
While the First Circuit held before Morrison that an element’s mere presence could
support the statute, it did not consider the jurisdictional element’s mere presence to
be sufficient to uphold the statutes in a later case. Compare United States v. Robinson,
137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge on the
grounds that § 2252(a)(4)(B) “contains an explicit jurisdictional element”), with
United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 12-15 (1st Cir. 2004) (agreeing with
Rodia’s assessment that the jurisdictional element of § 2251(a) could not support the
law on its own). The First Circuit still upheld the statute, but it did so on grounds
analogous to those in Raich. See id. at 20-21.
180
See United States v. Betcher, No. 07-2173, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15570, at *5-6
(8th Cir. July 22, 2008) (rejecting the argument that the child pornography statutes
are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, relying on post-Morrison Eighth Circuit decisions); United States v. Mugan, 394 F.3d 1016, 1020-24 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the “express” jurisdictional nexus and the required proof thereof sufficient to place
the statute beyond constitutional attack); United States v. Hampton, 260 F.3d 832, 834-35
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hoggard, 254 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2001).
181
In Mugan, for instance, the court described Bausch as holding that “the statute’s
‘express jurisdictional element,’ which limits prosecution to cases in which the depictions or the underlying materials had been transported in interstate commerce, ensured that ‘each defendant’s pornography possession affected interstate commerce.’”
Mugan, 394 F.3d at 1021.
179

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

654

[Vol. 157: 617

Eighth Circuit has indicated a willingness to assess the individual functioning of each.
The Eighth Circuit’s move away from its bright-line rule and to
the individual consideration of each jurisdictional element makes
sense because it is likely that the Third Circuit’s reasoning is most in
line with Morrison. As Professor Fischer explains,
[t]he Rodia approach is more consistent with Morrison than the Eighth
Circuit’s approach, since Morrison did not state that the mere presence
of a jurisdictional element in a statute will automatically render that
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause (nor would the absence of a jurisdictional hook render the statute automatically unconstitutional). Rather Morrison, citing Lopez, held that the presence of a jurisdictional hook may (as opposed to must) render a statute
constitutional under the Commerce Clause where that jurisdictional
element “might limit [the statute’s] reach to a discrete set . . . of [intrastate] possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or
182
effect on interstate commerce.

Furthermore, a clear lesson of Morrison was that the Supreme Court
will resist any attempt by Congress to circumvent the limits of the
Commerce Clause simply by the inclusion of “magic words” or “pre183
textual incantations.”
Instead, the Court strongly insisted that an
activity’s connection to interstate commerce must be evaluated by
courts and must not be too attenuated. It is likely that in the case of
jurisdictional elements as well, the Court will require that the connection they establish to interstate commerce be tested by courts and be
similarly substantial. The Third Circuit’s reasoning that the mere
presence of a jurisdictional element does not render a statute per se
constitutional therefore seems most in line with the Supreme Court’s
precedent.
B. Sufficiency of the Jurisdictional Element in the Matthew Shepard Act
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element is insufficient, it would next consider whether the
particular jurisdictional element of the Matthew Shepard Act sufficiently guarantees a connection to interstate commerce. As the Third
Circuit made clear in Rodia, “[a] jurisdictional element is only suffi-

182

Fischer, supra note 145, at 119 (alterations in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000)).
183
See United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546
U.S. 801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
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cient to ensure a statute’s constitutionality when the element either
limits the regulation to interstate activity or ensures that the intrastate
activity to be regulated falls within one of the three categories of con184
gressional power.” These “three categories of congressional power”
refer to the three areas in which Lopez indicated that Congress may
legislate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) ac185
tivities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
When analyzing a jurisdictional element for its sufficiency, a court will look at the
most extensive reach of the statute as limited by the jurisdictional
element. If any prong of the jurisdictional element present in a particular statute allows for federal jurisdiction over activities that are not
guaranteed to have a sufficient connection to interstate commerce,
the jurisdictional element will not be sufficient to sustain the statute’s
186
constitutionality.
When Congress seeks to regulate activities that are said to substantially affect interstate commerce, there are at least three main types of
jurisdictional elements that it may use: “affecting commerce” prongs;
“persons, things, or channels” prongs; and “materials in commerce”
prongs. Affecting-commerce prongs are the most straightforward in
that they simply require the government to prove that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce every time it seeks to exert jurisdiction. Persons-things-or-channels prongs, in contrast, seek to ensure
that the regulation is of the person, thing, or channel of interstate
commerce—rather than of a separate activity—thus bringing the regulation out of the realm of the substantial-effects test. Materials-incommerce prongs trigger jurisdiction over intrastate activities when
the government can show that the defendant used some object that
had previously traveled in interstate commerce in connection with his
offense. The ways in which courts have dealt with each of these
prongs is helpful in understanding the contours of a properly limiting
jurisdictional element and therefore deserve separate attention.
1. Affecting-Commerce Prongs
In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that the words
“affecting commerce” “signal Congress’ intent to invoke its full au184

Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
186
Cf. Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1062 (declaring a jurisdictional element insufficient
because one of its prongs allowed impermissible applications).
185

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

656

[Vol. 157: 617

187

thority under the Commerce Clause.” As stated in Lopez, the “outer
limit” of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is the
power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, persons or
things in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect
188
interstate commerce. When used as part of a regulation aimed at an
intrastate activity that is said to substantially affect interstate commerce, this type of jurisdictional element requires that the government prove in each case that the defendant’s conduct actually sub189
stantially affects interstate commerce.
In this way, these types of
catchall jurisdictional elements do ensure, on a case-by-case basis, a
sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
Section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Matthew Shepard Act triggers federal jurisdiction when the violent crime “interferes with commercial
or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged,” or “other190
wise affects interstate commerce.” This catchall provision would require the government to prove either that the defendant was engaged
in economic activity or that his activity otherwise substantially affects
interstate commerce in each case in which the federal government
claims jurisdiction. As the Court noted in Lopez, this type of jurisdictional element requires proof of a substantial connection to interstate
commerce each time, and would therefore guarantee that the exercise
191
of federal jurisdiction is appropriate.
2. Persons-Things-or-Channels Prongs
Jurisdictional elements that ensure that a statute only regulates
persons or things in, or channels of, interstate commerce have gener192
ally been sufficient to uphold a statute under a facial challenge.
In
Morrison, the Court cited with approval a statute similar to VAWA prohibiting persons who cross state lines from committing a crime of vio-

187

529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000); see also, e.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371
U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (establishing that the words “affecting commerce” indicate Congress’s intention to exercise jurisdiction to the full limits of the Commerce Clause).
188
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-59.
189
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); Maxwell, 386 F.3d at
1061 (analyzing the defendant’s conduct and finding fatal the fact that its “link to a
substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . is exceedingly attenuated”); Fischer, supra note 145, at 119 (noting that a jurisdictional element needs to ensure that the conduct at issue affects interstate commerce).
190
S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007).
191
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
192
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5.

2008]

Jurisdictional Analysis of Federal Hate Crime Laws

657

193

lence against a spouse.
The Court noted that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction . . . , reasoning that
‘[t]he provision properly falls within the first of Lopez’s categories as it
regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce—i.e., the use of
the interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods
194
move.’” Similarly, in United States v. Dorsey, the Ninth Circuit upheld
an amended version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lo195
pez. The amended GFSZA made it a federal crime to “knowingly . . .
possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate
or foreign commerce at a place the individual knows, or has reason196
able cause to believe, is a school zone.”
Because the jurisdictional
element ensures that the statute regulates the gun itself, and requires
that the government prove that the gun has moved in interstate commerce, it guarantees that the activity will be within the power of Congress to regulate a thing in interstate commerce.
Section 7(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Matthew Shepard Act regulates persons or things in interstate commerce and the channels of interstate
commerce by prohibiting persons who cross state lines from committing crimes of violence based on the victim’s membership in a named
197
class.
As the Court noted in Morrison, this type of jurisdictional element has been “uniformly upheld” by the courts of appeals as a valid
198
regulation of the interstate transportation system. Similarly, section
7(a)(2)(B)(ii) regulates the channels of interstate commerce by pro199
hibiting their use to commit a crime of violence.
Based on the
Ninth Circuit’s holding in Dorsey, and the Morrison Court’s apparent
approval of these prongs, it is likely that the Court will find this prong
sufficiently limiting.
3. Materials-in-Commerce Prongs
In contrast to affecting-commerce prongs and persons-things-orchannels prongs, courts have generally held that materials-incommerce prongs are too broad to support a statute. This type of ju-

193
194

Id.
Id. at 614 n.5 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir.

1999)).
195
196
197
198
199

United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1045 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000)).
S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 n.5 (citing Lankford, 196 F.3d at 571-72).
S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007).
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risdictional element triggers federal jurisdiction over a defendant who
is not otherwise involved with interstate commerce simply because she
used a material that had been in interstate commerce for some aspect
of her crime. The child pornography statutes discussed above contain
this type of prong, and it is the presence of this materials-in-commerce
prong that has led all but the Eighth Circuit to declare the jurisdictional element of these statutes insufficient to support the law on its
200
own.
The child pornography statutes make it a crime to possess or
manufacture child pornography that “has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was
produced by using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or trans201
ported.”
The emphasized portion of this statute’s jurisdictional element is its materials-in-commerce prong, which seeks to claim jurisdiction over the purely intrastate possession of child pornography
because it was produced using materials that had previously traveled
in interstate commerce.
Courts that have moved beyond the mere presence of these statutes’ jurisdictional elements to determine if they are sufficiently limiting to ensure the laws’ constitutionality have consistently held them to
202
be insufficient.
The basic problem identified in these courts’ opinions is that a prosecutor’s proof that some material has traveled in interstate commerce tells the court very little about whether the defendant’s possession of child pornography substantially affected interstate
commerce. In this way it fails to ensure a sufficient connection between the source of federal jurisdiction (i.e., the materials) and the
activity being regulated (i.e., the possession of child pornography).
This failure is a source of concern for two reasons. First, the statute’s failure to ensure more of a connection to interstate commerce
means that the law does not do what Lopez requires a jurisdictional
element to do: guarantee that the regulated activity has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce every time jurisdiction can be established. For example, courts have noted that proof that a defendant
used some materials (e.g., film, cameras, or disks) that have traveled
in interstate commerce does not necessarily mean that that defendant’s possession of child pornography has a substantial effect on in200

See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 145, at 118-21 (discussing this circuit split).
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2251(a)–(b)
(prohibiting the manufacture of child pornography); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (prohibiting the possession of child pornography).
202
See Fischer, supra note 145, at 109-21 (surveying the cases addressing the sufficiency of the jurisdictional element in the child pornography statutes).
201
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203

terstate commerce.
These courts note the attenuated connection
between the activity being regulated—the possession of child pornography—and the objects through which federal prosecutors claim ju204
risdiction—the film, cameras, or disks.
Rather than guaranteeing
that the possession of child pornography substantially affects interstate commerce, these courts see the materials-in-commerce prong as
an effort by Congress to claim jurisdiction over purely intrastate activities by using a jurisdictional hook that rests on an attenuated connection to interstate commerce—much as it attempted to gain control
over intrastate violent crime by including attenuated findings in
205
VAWA.
The second cause for concern in these courts is that a materials-incommerce prong has no conceivable limit. Through a materials-incommerce prong Congress could potentially claim jurisdiction over
any type of criminal activity, including theft, murder, or even violent
crime in general. For instance, if a materials-in-commerce prong
could support a statute, Congress would have the power to pass a law
making it a federal offense to commit a violent crime, including murder, if the defendant uses a weapon that has traveled in interstate
commerce. This statute would suddenly give federal authorities the
power to prosecute nearly every violent crime committed in the
United States because almost all violent crimes are committed with a
206
weapon that at some point has traveled in interstate commerce.
There are, however, few areas of control more traditionally left to the
207
states than the regulation of violent crime. A jurisdictional element

203

As the First Circuit noted in United States v. Morales-De Jesús,

[t]he jurisdictional element focuses on things such as film, cameras, videotapes, and recorders moving in interstate commerce, which are then used to
produce child pornography. As a matter of logic, this Commerce Clause
premise has the kind of flaw so worrisome to the Supreme Court in Lopez and
Morrison—it could justify federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted by
the states, solely because the criminal used “materials that have been mailed,
shipped, or transported in interstate [or] foreign commerce by any means.”
372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004).
204
Id. at 14-15.
205
See Fischer, supra note 145, at 119-20; see also supra notes 170-179 and accompanying text.
206
See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Andrew St.
Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 113 (1998)).
207
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (“[W]e can think of no
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Govern-
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that allows Congress to regulate nearly every violent crime committed
within the United States cannot be sufficiently limiting to ensure a
law’s constitutionality.
Materials-in-commerce prongs therefore attempt to use an attenuated connection to interstate commerce to reach a potentially limitless
class of activities. In this respect, they present courts with the same
problems that the Supreme Court identified in Morrison. As the First
Circuit stated, the materials-in-commerce prong suffers from “the
kind of flaw so worrisome to the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison—it could justify federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted
by the states, solely because the criminal used ‘materials that have
been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate [or] foreign com208
merce by any means.’”
Morrison makes clear that the Court will be
highly skeptical of anything that allows Congress to claim a general
legislative power over areas traditionally regulated by the states, particularly when its method depends on the use of an attenuated and
209
indirect connection to interstate commerce.
It is important to note that the jurisdictional element held insufficient by these courts contains a persons-things-or-channels prong as
well as a materials-in-commerce prong. But in these cases the presence of the materials-in-commerce prong prevented the jurisdictional
element from sustaining the statutes under constitutional challenge
because a jurisdictional element will only be as limiting as its broadest
210
prong.
In fact, the presence of both types of prongs helps to illustrate the important difference between a persons-things-or-channels
prong and a materials-in-commerce prong. As noted above, a persons-things-or-channels prong brings the activity being regulated out
of the realm of the substantial-effects test, where it must contend with
the requirements of Lopez, and ensures that the law is a regulation of a
ment and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication
of its victims.”).
208
Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 14.
209
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (“We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”).
210
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1062 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting § 2252(a)(5)(B) because the statute’s utilization of the materials-in-commerce
prong did not sufficiently cabin the statute’s reach to guarantee a substantial effect on
interstate commerce), vacated, 546 U.S. 801 (2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.
2006); Rodia, 194 F.3d at 473 (holding the materials-in-commerce prong to be “almost
useless” in limiting regulation to activity that substantially affects interstate commerce,
but nonetheless finding that the statute survived because the activity being regulated
was substantially related to interstate commerce).
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person or thing in interstate commerce or the channels of interstate
commerce, rather than of some other activity.
For example, the persons-things-or-channels prong of the child
pornography statutes makes it a federal crime to possess child pornography that has itself been transported or shipped across state
211
lines.
In contrast, the materials-in-commerce prong makes it a federal crime to possess child pornography that has never moved beyond
one state, so long as it was produced using materials that have been
212
transported or shipped across state lines.
The activity being regulated in both of these situations is the possession of child pornography, and it is this activity that must be shown to be within one of the
three categories of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause. Under the persons-things-or-channels prong, if federal prosecutors can show that the child pornography was shipped or moved
across state lines, they have shown that the pornography itself is a
“thing” in interstate commerce over which Congress clearly has regulatory power.
If, however, the pornography itself never moved across state lines,
it cannot be said to be an object in interstate commerce. In that situation the prosecutors must use the materials-in-commerce prong to
claim jurisdiction, and they must establish that the intrastate possession of child pornography substantially affects interstate commerce.
Because this activity falls under the substantial-effects test, all the requirements of Lopez become applicable, and the connection between
the grounds for federal authority and the activity being regulated
must not be too attenuated. Importantly, it is not the use of the interstate materials that is being regulated, but rather, as noted above, the
possession of child pornography. Had it chosen to, Congress could
have regulated the interstate materials because they are things in in-

211

See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (prohibiting the possession or manufacture of child pornography that “has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce”); see also id. § 2251(b) (allowing for the punishment of
parents who allow their children to be the subject of child pornography, if the parent
knows that the depiction will be transported in interstate commerce, or that the materials used to make the depiction have been transported in interstate commerce); id.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) (criminalizing the knowing possession of any “material that contains
an image of child pornography that has been . . . transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means”).
212
See id. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (prohibiting the possession or manufacture of child
pornography that has not been shipped or transported across state lines but that “was
produced using materials that have been mailed, or so shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means”).
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terstate commerce. But, in the case of a materials-in-commerce
prong, Congress is seeking not to regulate the materials themselves
but some other activity that is claimed to have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. As noted above, however, the use of materials
that have traveled in interstate commerce cannot be said to “guarantee” that the possession of child pornography substantially affects interstate commerce. The relationship is too attenuated and indirect, and
because a materials-in-commerce prong leaves the activity being regulated inside the realm of the substantial-effects test, such a connection
is not sufficient to support the law.
This is also the basis for the distinction courts have drawn between
the materials-in-commerce prong of the child pornography statutes
and the persons-things-or-channels prong of the firearm regulations
in 18 U.S.C. § 922. These laws prohibit the possession of guns by various individuals, and in various situations, including the familiar pro213
hibition on the possession of a gun in a school zone.
In fact, after
the Supreme Court struck down the GFSZA in Lopez, Congress
amended the statute to include a jurisdictional element. After its
amendment, that law now says that it is illegal to possess, in a school
214
zone, a gun “that has moved in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.”
215
As mentioned above, courts have upheld this statute as a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because of
216
the proper functioning of its jurisdictional element.
Courts that
have considered the child pornography statutes have distinguished
the laws in § 922, and their jurisdictional element, from the child
pornography laws with their materials-in-commerce prong. These
courts have reasoned that a prohibition on the possession of an object
of interstate commerce is different from a prohibition on the possession of an intrastate object produced using some interstate materi217
als.
A prohibition on the possession of an object of interstate commerce is seemingly valid as a regulation of persons or things in
213

Id. § 922(q).
Id. § 922(q)(2)(A).
215
See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
216
See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (“This jurisdictional element saves § 922(q) from the infirmity that defeated it in Lopez.”);
United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the amended statute against a Commerce Clause challenge because the
statute “contains an interstate-commerce requirement” in its jurisdictional element).
217
See, e.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) (reasoning
that a prohibition of possession of a weapon that has moved across state lines is not
equivalent to a prohibition of homicides using such weapons).
214
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interstate commerce. But a prohibition on the use of that object for
some other illegal activity is no longer a regulation of the object itself,
but of the activity. For the regulation of the activity to be a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, that activity
must substantially affect interstate commerce. If a jurisdictional element does not ensure this substantial effect, the element cannot support the law. As the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated, “[i]t is one thing
for Congress to prohibit possession of a weapon that has itself moved
in interstate commerce, but it is quite another thing for Congress to
218
prohibit homicides using such weapons.”
In this sense, it is clear that a persons-things-or-channels element
and a materials-in-commerce element must do different things to
support their respective laws. For a persons-things-or-channels element to ensure that the possession of an object is prohibitable by
Congress, it only has to ensure that the object is, in fact, one of interstate commerce—i.e., that it indeed has traveled across state lines.
But in order to support a law relying on a materials-in-commerce element, that element must ensure that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce—a much more difficult standard to
meet. It may be that there are some activities so intricately connected
to the materials used in their commission that the connection between the interstate travel of the materials and the interstate impact of
the activity may guarantee the requisite nexus in each case. Under
219
Morrison, this is a judicial question. But in the case of the child pornography statutes, it has been the near universal opinion of the courts
of appeals that the connection between the materials used to create
child pornography and the interstate impact of the possession of child
220
pornography is too attenuated to guarantee this connection.
The materials-in-commerce prong of the Matthew Shepard Act’s
jurisdictional element prohibits the use of a “firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon that has traveled in interstate or for221
eign commerce.”
This prong, similar to the materials-in-commerce
218

Id.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“‘[W]hether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.’” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995))).
220
See Fischer, supra note 145, at 109-18 (describing the holdings and reasoning of
the cases addressing the sufficiency of the materials-in-commerce prong in the child
pornography statutes).
221
S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2007).
219
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prong of the child pornography statutes, suffers from both dangers
that courts have identified with respect to these elements. First, it is
unclear how the fact that a weapon has traveled in interstate commerce “guarantees” that a bias-motivated violent crime substantially
affects interstate commerce. In that sense, the connection between
the trigger for federal jurisdiction and the activity being regulated is
just as attenuated as that of the child pornography statutes. Because it
does not fulfill the task assigned by Lopez—to guarantee that each time
jurisdiction can be established the activity regulated substantially affects interstate commerce—the Matthew Shepard Act’s jurisdictional
element is not sufficient to support the bill.
Similarly, the materials-in-commerce prong of the Matthew
Shepard Act opens up an area of criminal law even more traditionally
regulated by the states than do the child pornography statutes. States
have always had the primary authority to regulate violent crime, and
courts will likely look with suspicion upon a materials-in-commerce
prong that would give federal authorities greater control over this
area. As one commentator has noted, a purely nominal jurisdictional
element, such as one containing a materials-in-commerce prong, gives
the federal government power over a nearly limitless class of criminal
activity because “virtually all criminal actions in the United States involve the use of some object that has passed through interstate com222
merce.”
The materials-in-commerce element of the Matthew
Shepard Act would, therefore, likely make nearly every bias-motivated
violent crime committed in the United States a federal offense. Without a very clear connection to interstate commerce, courts will be extremely hesitant to approve a jurisdictional element that so significantly upsets the federal/state balance. Because the connection
between the fact that the weapon has traveled in interstate commerce
and the effect of the bias-motivated crime on interstate commerce is
indirect and attenuated, it seems very unlikely that courts will allow
the Matthew Shepard Act’s materials-in-commerce prong to support
the bill.

222

St. Laurent, supra note 206, at 113. The Third Circuit quoted St. Laurent in its
decision in United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999). After quoting the
statement above, the court went on to say that, in the case of the child pornography
statutes before it, “[a]s a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost
useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient child pornographers will rely on film,
cameras, or chemicals that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall
within the sweep of the statute.” Id.
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4. The Matthew Shepard Act’s Jurisdictional Element at Work
To illustrate the problems caused by the breadth of a materials-incommerce prong, imagine a scenario in which the federal government seeks to claim jurisdiction over a purely local bias-motivated
crime. Suppose that while walking through a public park, the defendant sees a man whom he believes to be homosexual playing a guitar
223
for recreation.
Because of the man’s perceived homosexuality, the
defendant shouts derogatory statements to which the musician does
not respond. Because his insults failed to disturb the musician, the
defendant grows angry, grabs the musician’s guitar, and begins to beat
him with it. The local police are called, arrest the defendant, and
224
charge him with a hate crime.
So far, this is a relatively straightforward case over which the local
authorities have clear power to prosecute. The defendant certainly
committed a crime of violence that seems to have been motivated by
his animus toward homosexuals. Assuming that state bias-crime laws
include sexual orientation as a protected class, the defendant will
probably be convicted of a bias-motivated violent crime.
Suppose, however, that federal prosecutors want to become involved in this case because, for instance, the state’s bias-crime law does
not cover crimes motivated by animus toward sexual orientation.
Leaving aside the other elements of the case, the federal prosecutors
would have to prove that the defendant’s crime substantially affects
interstate commerce for jurisdiction to be proper under the Matthew

223

Whether or not the victim is actually a member of the protected class is irrelevant because the Matthew Shepard Act brings under its scope crimes committed based
on the defendant’s belief that the victim is a member of a particular class. See S. 1105,
110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(A) (2007) (prohibiting crimes of violence committed because
of the victim’s “actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability”).
224
This fact pattern is adapted from the case of Angel Santaurio. Santaurio was
carrying his guitar while walking to a local motel to see a band perform. As he passed
a bar frequented by homosexuals—at which he had been a janitor—a truck pulled up
and one of its passengers yelled homophobic insults at him. When Santaurio did not
respond, the truck’s passengers got out of the truck and began to beat Santaurio with
his own guitar. The passengers pled no contest to local assault and hate crime charges
and were ordered to pay more than $14,000 in restitution to Santaurio, in addition to
serving three-year prison terms. See Jon Wiener, Defendant in Hate Crime Case to Be Tried,
MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE (Mountain View, Cal.), July 23, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.mv-voice.com/morgue/2004/2004_07_23.trial.shtml (last visited Nov. 15,
2008). Because Santaurio’s assault interfered with his ability to watch the band, and
because this is arguably commercial activity, section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) of the Matthew
Shepard Act may have triggered federal jurisdiction in this case.
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Shepard Act. To do this, they would have to prove one of the jurisdictional elements in section 7(a)(2)(B).
At first glance, it seems that the federal prosecutors would have
difficulty showing how the defendant’s crime substantially affects interstate commerce. Neither the defendant nor the victim crossed
state lines or was engaged in any commercial activity. In fact, as a
purely local, non-economic, violent crime, this seems like the paradigmatic case in which a federal government of limited powers should
not be able to exert authority. Thus, if the jurisdictional element of
the Matthew Shepard Act does in fact limit the class of cases covered
by the bill to those that substantially affect interstate commerce, one
would expect that federal prosecutors would be unable to prove any
aspect of the element in this case.
The outcome of this analysis is as predicted for all but the materials-in-commerce prong of the Matthew Shepard Act. First, because no
one crossed state lines, section 7(a)(2)(B)(i) does not apply. Second,
the defendant used no channel or facility of interstate commerce to
commit the crime, so section 7(a)(2)(B)(ii) also fails to trigger federal
jurisdiction. Third, because the assault did not interfere with any
commercial activity of the victim, section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) cannot be
the source of jurisdiction either. Of course, the federal prosecutors
are free to prove that the assault “otherwise substantially affects interstate commerce” under section 7(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II), but because of the
local and non-economic nature of the case, they will have difficulty
doing so.
So far the result is consistent with the initial assessment that the
assault does not substantially affect interstate commerce. Were these
four prongs the only means of triggering federal jurisdiction, the bill
would most likely be constitutional because the jurisdictional element
seems to limit the class of cases to which the bill will apply to those
having a substantial connection with interstate commerce. Problems
arise, however, when federal prosecutors attempt to assert jurisdiction
under the materials-in-commerce prong of section 7(a)(2)(B)(iii).
Here the prosecutors would have to prove that a weapon—the guitar,
in this case—has traveled in interstate commerce. To do this, they
would simply have to show that the victim’s guitar had been manufactured in any state other than the one in which the crime occurred.
Most likely the prosecutors would be able to prove this, and the materials-in-commerce prong would therefore trigger federal jurisdiction.
But is this the correct result? Does the fact that the prosecutors
can prove that the guitar was manufactured somewhere other than
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the state in which the crime took place guarantee that this particular
crime substantially affects interstate commerce? Did the fact that the
guitar could someday be used as a weapon with which the victim could
be beaten enter into the victim’s mind when he purchased it in such a
way that it would affect his decision whether or not to buy the guitar?
Does the location in which the guitar was manufactured tell us anything about the assault’s effect on interstate commerce?
It is likely that the answer to all of these questions is no, and that
the materials-in-commerce prong does a poor job of fulfilling the
purpose of a jurisdictional element: to limit the class of cases brought
under the scope of the statute to those that substantially affect interstate commerce. In fact, extending the analysis to more traditional
weapons, it is likely that the materials-in-commerce prong will bring
nearly every case within the scope of the Matthew Shepard Act simply
because the defendant used a weapon that at some point had been
225
shipped across state lines.
This is exactly the problem that has led
all circuits but the Eighth to find the jurisdictional element of the
226
child pornography statutes unsatisfactorily broad.
Although the jurisdictional limitations of section 7(a)(2)(B)(i)–
(ii) restrict the class of activities regulated to those that have a sufficient connection with interstate commerce, the Matthew Shepard

225

It is conceivable that Congress could prohibit the possession of guitars that have
moved interstate because these guitars themselves are the “things in interstate commerce.” But this does not mean that Congress could prohibit, for instance, the playing
of guitars. That is, Congress could not prohibit the playing of guitars generally. Congress could, most likely, prohibit the playing of guitars for money because this would
probably qualify as “economic” behavior that is entitled to deference under Lopez. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995). Congress could also potentially
argue that, because of its desire to eliminate the market for guitars, a prohibition on
playing guitars is necessary to prevent the appearance of homemade guitar-like instruments that would circumvent the statute, but this would be decided on Raich
grounds rather than based on any type of jurisdictional-element analysis. Similarly,
Congress cannot prohibit the use of guitars (or any other weapon) to commit violent
crimes without the crime itself having some connection to interstate commerce.
226
See United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that
the materials-in-commerce prong of the child pornography statutes can be used as a
justification for “federalizing a vast array of crimes now prosecuted by the states, solely
because the criminal used ‘materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in
interstate [or] foreign commerce by any means’”); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d
465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some entity or object involved in the crime be drawn from interstate commerce, does nothing
to prevent the shifting of [the federal/state] balance in favor of the federal government. As has been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal actions in the United
States involve the use of some object that has passed through interstate commerce.”
(alterations in original) (quoting St. Laurent, supra note 206)).
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Act’s jurisdictional element is likely still too broad because the materials-in-commerce prong allows for federal jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Commerce Clause. Since the jurisdictional element does not
sufficiently limit the class of activities to those having the requisite
connection with interstate commerce, the bill cannot be distinguished
from Morrison’s VAWA. Like VAWA, the bill is not an economic regulation, contains findings showing only an attenuated connection to interstate commerce, is not an essential part of a larger economic regulation, and does not contain a sufficiently limiting jurisdictional
element. Therefore, as with VAWA, the Matthew Shepard Act is likely
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL HATE CRIME LAWS
Because the Matthew Shepard Act is unconstitutionally broad, the
question that remains is how Congress should remedy this defect.
Congress can easily amend the bill to remove the constitutional question by simply eliminating the materials-in-commerce prong, without
which the bill appears to be sufficiently limited to cases that qualify as
227
“substantially affecting interstate commerce.”
Even if Congress
chooses to take its chances with the current version of the bill, the Supreme Court can still easily declare the materials-in-commerce prong
invalid under the above analysis but maintain the rest of the law by
severing the unconstitutional prong. The debate, then, concerns the
wisdom, not the possibility, of a federal hate crime law without a materials-in-commerce prong.
One reason why Congress will likely hesitate to remove the materials-in-commerce prong from the Matthew Shepard Act is that this
prong is the hook that allows the bill to reach most cases. Unfortunately for the bill’s supporters, it is precisely the prong’s strength in
bringing a large number of cases under the jurisdiction of the bill that
makes the jurisdictional element unconstitutionally broad. It is clear
that a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-in-commerce prong is
much more limited in scope than a Matthew Shepard Act with such a
prong because, in its absence, federal prosecutors will have to estab-
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That is, the other prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element appear to limit the
class of potential cases to those that “substantially affect interstate commerce” under
the tests laid out in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Whether or not
these cases actually affect interstate commerce is another, more normative, question
that this Comment does not seek to answer.
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lish that the crime in question qualifies under one of the other, much
more limited, prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element.
In fact, without the materials-in-commerce prong, even the murder of Matthew Shepard would have been beyond the reach of the
Matthew Shepard Act. In that case, the gun that the defendants used
228
to beat Shepard was, most likely, manufactured outside of Wyoming,
therefore triggering jurisdiction under a materials-in-commerce
prong. But without a materials-in-commerce prong, it is clear that
Shepard’s murder would not trigger jurisdiction under any of the
bill’s remaining jurisdictional-element prongs because no one crossed
state lines, was engaged in commercial activity, or used a channel of
229
interstate commerce to commit the crime.
Not only would a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-incommerce prong fail to reach the murder of Matthew Shepard, but the
murder of James Byrd, Jr., would also be beyond the reach of such a
bill. In that case, the objects used by the defendants to beat Byrd, the
chain used to tie him to the back of the pickup truck, and even the
truck with which the defendants dragged him could all arguably have
230
been grounds for jurisdiction under a materials-in-commerce prong.
Absent such a prong, however, federal prosecutors would have been
unable to prove the connection to interstate commerce required to
establish jurisdiction over the crime, and prosecution would have
been left to the state, just as it was without the Matthew Shepard Act.
Without a materials-in-commerce prong, the Matthew Shepard
Act reaches only a very limited class of cases in which a defendant
crosses state lines, uses a channel of interstate commerce, or somehow
interferes with the economic activity of the victim. What, then, is the
need for an essentially powerless federal hate crime statute that does
not even respond to the two headline-making crimes that led to its
proposal?
Given that an amended Matthew Shepard Act is essentially powerless, Congress should abandon its attempt to pass the bill because the
expansion of federal criminal law brings costs of its own. First, federal
prosecutions tend to make the criminal justice system less efficient by
231
introducing complexities that do not exist in state prosecutions.
228

See Brooke, supra note 21, at A9 (describing the circumstances of Shepard’s
murder and noting that the defendants beat him with a .357 magnum handgun).
229
See Matthew Shepard Act, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a)(2)(B) (2007).
230
For a detailed description of the circumstances of Byrd’s murder, see ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 235-41.
231
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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Even though the deletion of the materials-in-commerce prong will reduce the number of federal prosecutions under the bill, federal officials must expend resources before a prosecution can be brought to
determine if the other jurisdictional elements of the Matthew Shepard
Act can be met, even if it is ultimately decided that a case does not
qualify for federal prosecution. Second, the respect for residual state
sovereignty is seriously diminished whenever the federal government
attempts to exert power over areas traditionally subject to state con232
trol.
Even a properly limited Matthew Shepard Act tends to undercut the power of the states to protect the safety of its citizens through
the police power by pressuring them to relinquish jurisdiction in cases
in which the federal government wants to get involved. If state law
were inadequate in some way, these intrusions may be justifiable, but,
as previously noted, state law has been able to do exactly what an
amended Matthew Shepard Act could not: send the murderers of
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., to prison for the rest of their
233
lives.
Given that a Matthew Shepard Act without a materials-incommerce prong gives federal prosecutors jurisdiction over a very
small number of cases in which state law already provides more than
adequate coverage, the benefits of a federal hate crime law do not
seem to justify its costs. Congress should therefore abandon its attempt to enact a federal hate crime statute rather than settle for a
Matthew Shepard Act amended to cure its constitutional defect.
CONCLUSION
Lopez signaled an important change not only in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, but also in the way that the Supreme Court will approach federal legislation in the future. In emphasizing that the
Commerce Clause is, in fact, a limited grant of legislative authority,
the Court signaled its intent to police the outer limits of the commerce power in order to maintain a proper federal/state balance.
The Court made clear that it will not hesitate to strike down statutes
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See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur
and political responsibility would become illusory.”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 748 (1999) (“Although the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our
federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their
status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”).
233
See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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that impermissibly encroach on that balance without a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
Congress, for its part, has attempted to circumvent this limit in
many ways. The three primary tools at its disposal after Lopez are the
jurisdictional element, congressional findings, and large regulatory
schemes aimed at interstate economic activity. In Morrison, the Court
had the opportunity to provide guidance about the effect of congressional findings on a Commerce Clause challenge, holding that these
findings would not support a statute with an overly attenuated connection to interstate commerce. In Raich, the Court clarified the types
of situations in which a particular regulation will qualify as a necessary
part of a larger regulation of economic activity. Remaining after these
three cases is the question of how limiting a jurisdictional element
must be in order to withstand constitutional challenge under the
Commerce Clause. If the Matthew Shepard Act is passed into law as
currently written, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
round out modern Commerce Clause doctrine by clarifying the law
regarding jurisdictional elements.
Moreover, the current version of the Matthew Shepard Act provides the perfect opportunity for the Court to place the final piece in
this doctrinal puzzle. First, because the Matthew Shepard Act is so
similar to VAWA, the bill is clearly unconstitutional without the juris234
dictional element.
Because the bill is unconstitutional without the
jurisdictional element, the Court will be able to isolate the effect of
the element and speak directly to this point without concerning itself
with any complications that may have arisen from a different outcome
on one of the other two Lopez factors (i.e., that the findings are less attenuated or that the regulation may more easily be considered part of
a larger economic regulation). The ability to isolate the effect of the
jurisdictional element in the Matthew Shepard Act means that the
Court will be able to clearly present its reasoning on exactly what an
element must do in order to ensure a statute’s constitutionality.
Second, because the Matthew Shepard Act contains practically
every type of jurisdictional-element prong currently present in federal
statutes, the Court will be able to address all prongs and assess the
constitutionality of each. As noted above, many of the prongs seem to
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This similarity includes both the type of conduct regulated (i.e., violence toward a person based on that person’s gender) and the findings relied on in support of
each statute.
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be constitutional based on the dicta of other cases, and it seems to
be only the materials-in-commerce prong that gives the bill unconstitutional breadth. By drawing this contrast between the properly limiting prongs of the bill’s jurisdictional element and the unconstitutional
materials-in-commerce prong, the Court will be able to give this area
of law a level of clarity that it has not enjoyed since Lopez. Ultimately,
this would serve both the lower courts, in their efforts to assess the
constitutionality of federal laws limited by jurisdictional elements, and
Congress, as it attempts to craft laws in accordance with the requirements and limits of the Constitution.
The controversial nature of the Matthew Shepard Act indicates
that challenges to its constitutionality will accompany any attempted
prosecutions. Because the bill’s materials-in-commerce prong, which
brings a nearly limitless class of cases under its scope, is squarely at
odds with Lopez’s resistance to a general federal legislative and police
power, the Matthew Shepard Act seems to be on a collision course
with the Court’s new Commerce Clause doctrine. Congress can prevent this collision by amending the bill to remove the materials-incommerce prong, but the political popularity of federal hate crime
legislation seems to indicate that Congress is unlikely to remove the
one part of the bill’s jurisdictional element that gives it any bite.
Should Congress leave it to the Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of the bill’s materials-in-commerce prong, the result will
likely be a landmark case of modern Commerce Clause doctrine, the
holding of which will define the role of the jurisdictional element
throughout all of federal law.
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See supra Part IV.B.1-2.

